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How can behavioral health stakeholders engage effectively with Texas’ government? To answer 
this question, my thesis examines three theories of effective advocacy: 1. Effective advocacy 
attempts to sway public attitudes. 2. Effective advocacy attempts to change who holds office. 3. 
Effective advocacy introduces policymakers to new ideas. As the thesis brings nuance to each 
argument, it also provides readers with a basic understanding of the Texas Legislature, Texas 
politics, and key actors in state government.  
Analysis is integrated with narrative vignettes and distilled into seven chapters, each covering 
one topic in behavioral health policy. These topics include behavioral health lobbying, mental 
health insurance policy, the Early Childhood Intervention program, the mental health in schools 
movement, substance use prevention, and the politics of homelessness and comorbid mental 
illness. Each chapter introduces readers to subfields in public mental health and the political 
processes relevant to them. Personal experience, secondary research, and a small set of 
interviews with policy professionals inform the thesis. Ultimately, I hope to empower 
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Sixty years ago, behavioral health policy was defined by the psychiatric facilities we see in 
horror films. Since then it has transformed into an optimistic but opaque and decentralized field, 
characterized by more effective medications, networks of community supports, and pervasive 
preventive educational programs. Still today, those concerned about behavioral health are often 
muzzled by stigma, and the care delivery system continues to fail the American people. 
Behavioral health refers to prevention and care of mental illness and substance use disorders. As 
behavioral illness increasingly permeates public discourse and continues to impact us on a 
personal level, it naturally impacts our politics.  
I am not a neutral commentator on this subject. Two of my friends, other full-time students, work 
jobs just to pay for the treatment of mental health diagnoses that their family members refuse to 
acknowledge. A third faces a waiting list of one month for an introductory appointment with the 
only provider that accepts his insurance. Another uses an addictive substance to fend off suicidal 
ideation. All have faced significant barriers accessing care. This fact should be no surprise since 
Texas ranks dead last in access to mental health care among the 50 states (MHA). The problem 
of unmet needs for mental health care, however, is not specific to Texas. Among developed 
countries, neuropsychiatric disorders are the leading categorical source of disease burden; second 
worldwide only to parasitic and infectious disease (Eaton et al.). 
For behavioral health stakeholders, political engagement is both a necessity and an opportunity. 
Texas’ state government has entangled itself in care, from licensing requirements to state-run 
health systems. Moving forward, a smart government role in health care promises improved 
access to care, quality control, public education, and research.  
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An overreaching government, however, can stifle innovation, cause provider burnout, and spread 
misinformation. Again, because state involvement in mental health care is non-negotiable and 
inherently neutral, stakeholders need to work with the state government. To aid in the endeavor, 
this thesis aims to answer: How can behavioral health stakeholders effectively engage with 
Texas’ government to improve the behavioral health care system? 
While this thesis will focus on the Texas Legislature, it will touch on advocacy before state 
agencies, local governments, and the courts. Before diving into advocacy strategies, this 
introductory chapter will provide a big picture take on the Texas government’s power structures, 
legislative session, politics, judicial system, and elections. By providing this context, the chapter 
will prime readers to think about structural factors in Texas policymaking. 
Arguably, the most powerful man in the state government is the Lieutenant Governor, Dan 
Patrick. Patrick largely controls the Legislative Budget Board, which drives state budgetary 
policy. Patrick also controls the flow of bills to Senate committees, who sits on each committee, 
who chairs each committee, and what bills get to the Senate floor for a final vote. Unlike 
Congress, the Texas Legislature does not have a discharge petition. In other words, Patrick has 
near complete control over the functions of the state Senate, including the confirmation of state 
agency executive nominees. 
There are institutional constraints on Patrick’s power. For example, the quorum rule requires two 
thirds of Senators to be present to conduct Senate business. Under the current party division, 
Patrick needs at least two Democrats in attendance to move legislation. Senate Democrats also 
have the numbers to block constitutional amendments and gubernatorial appointments. That said, 
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if you want to create statewide policy, you cannot make an enemy of Patrick. For this reason, 
among others, the Texas legislature operates in a relatively bipartisan manner. 
Patrick is one member of the “Big Three,” the most important political players in Texas. The 
speaker of the house, most recently Dennis Bonnen, and the governor, Greg Abbott, constitute 
the other two members. The speaker has similar control over the House of Representatives as the 
lieutenant governor does the Senate. Texas’ governor is weak relative to the chief executives of 
other states, but enjoys significant powers including the bully pulpit and a line-item veto. The 
governor’s veto is typically final, and he has the power to call special legislative sessions to force 
action on any specific issue. The governor also enjoys the power of appointment to 1500 
positions, including seats on several behavioral health advisory councils. The lieutenant governor 
and governor are directly elected statewide, whereas the speaker of the house is elected by 
members of the House of Representatives. 
The Texas legislature meets for just 140 days every other year. The resulting whirlwind means a 
lot of good bills die, and some bad bills pass by accident. Speaking generally, any controversy or 
opposition will kill a bill early in the legislative process. If it does not, controversy late in the 
process can halt the orderly progression of bills on the floor, causing the death of many pieces of 
legislation. The exception to this rule is, of course, when a controversial bill is a priority of the 
Big Three. Examples include creating a right to carry weapons on college campuses and banning 
the direction of federal funds to Planned Parenthood. In these cases, Republican leaders risk the 
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legislative session grinding to a halt, and Democrat lawmakers decide whether blocking the 
legislation would be worth the retaliation of the Big Three.1 
An adversarial, interest-group-dominated model drives health policymaking in the legislature. 
Most advocacy and trade groups derive their policy positions through a process of coalition 
building and with input from those on the front lines; however, some groups start with 
ideological positions and build cases around them (Murphy). While a few groups have the 
expertise and resources to research and form data-driven policy positions, Texas lacks the health 
information infrastructure that has enabled other states to rely more heavily on this approach 
(Khurshid). 
Zooming in on the 86th Legislature: The Big Three focused on property tax and school finance 
reform, whereas in other recent sessions the focus was school voucher programs, “bathroom 
bills,” and “sanctuary city” laws. The shift to “bread and butter” policy issues resulted in a 
relatively productive, collegial, and drama-light session, although Patrick attributed the change to 
the departure of moderate former Speaker Joe Straus. All that said, the Legislature still passed a 
few bills on charged topics, including voting rights (Ramsey) and local partnerships with 
abortion providers (Sundaram). The Legislature also passed a “religious exemption” bill meant 




1 When Senate Democrats blocked the reconfirmation of former Secretary of State David 
Whitley, Governor Abbott vetoed several of their bills. Since his vetoes came after the end of the 
legislative session, there was no opportunity to override them (Ura and Platoff). 
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Texas’ judicial branch operates independently from the Big Three and the Legislature. With the 
exception of the Texas Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Third Court of 
Appeals, Texas’ judicial system is funded predominantly at the local level. Furthermore, except 
for (most) municipal judges, Texas judges are elected in partisan elections by those that they 
serve. The topic of distinguishing effective advocacy in judicial policy, particularly as it relates 
to specialty courts, is important, but does not fit within the scope of this project. This thesis will 
discuss judicial policy, but only as it relates to work done primarily by the legislature and state 
agencies. 
Turning to elections, Democrats do well in the big cities, and Republicans do well everywhere 
else. The key exceptions are in the suburbs of Austin, Dallas, and Houston. In these political 
battlegrounds, Democrats have gained significant momentum in the past two years (Gillman). 
When it comes to statewide elections, everyone acknowledges that the Republican primaries 
matter more than the general election. Texas is, of course, a conservative state, and both major 
political parties reflect as much. Election campaigns, meanwhile, are awash in dark money 
because the state very rarely enforces its campaign finance laws (Goldenstein and Morris).  
If Texas’ political system seems antiquated and unsalvageable to you, you would not be alone. I 
believe, however, that there is significant opportunity to work within the current system to effect 
meaningful, if limited, change in behavioral health policy. I have encountered three theories 
defining effective advocacy in this field. After presenting them, I will make arguments that bring 
nuance to each. 1. Effective advocacy attempts to sway public attitudes. 2. Effective 
advocacy attempts to change who holds office. 3. Effective advocacy brings new ideas to the 
attention of policymakers. 
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On the first point, public opinion ties lawmakers’ hands on polarized issues. If lawmakers want 
to keep their jobs, they need to vote as their constituents want on all bills related to guns, 
abortion, marijuana, climate change, and health insurance. These issues not only command the 
public’s attention, but also determine access to campaign funds (Gerstle). Additionally, 
lawmakers may have to play a “scorecard” game. Interest groups score lawmakers based on their 
votes on specific bills. Lawmakers in tight races may vote to get the scores their constituents and 
donors want.  
But what happens when votes come up on issues that do not rise to the level of public awareness 
or are unlikely to appear on scorecards? Over 7000 bills were considered during the 140-day 86th 
legislative session (LRL). The vast majority of bills received little or no press. In these cases, 
lawmakers can and do vote how they please. The public does not have a clear opinion on the 
majority of issues before the Texas Legislature; therefore, public opinion cannot influence the 
likelihood of these bills’ passage. Scorecards have a similarly limited influence. Even when a bill 
ends up on a scorecard, some lawmakers strategize with other members to ensure they only vote 
against legislation, to score points, when doing so will not impact the success of the bill. 
For advocates, some issues (especially those that are already polarized) must be fought in the 
public light, perhaps through social media or public education campaigns. By swaying the 
public, you can untie lawmakers’ hands and possibly force action. For most issues, however, a 
keen strategist would keep his bill out of the limelight and pray it does not end up on a scorecard. 
Advocates who work to change public attitudes seek ultimately to change the political calculus 
that determines the fate of legislation. Some advocates believe a better way to change the math is 
to change who is in power. These individuals might spend their time volunteering for political 
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campaigns and registering voters. Their philosophy holds true particularly for issues decided by 
local officials and those elected into key statewide positions. Skilled and open-minded local 
judges, for example, are pre-requisites for the implementation of mental health courts (Murphy), 
and as mentioned, the Lieutenant Governor has unparalleled power in the Legislature. Moreover, 
some local issues require a supportive state representative and senator. For example, a county 
needs the support of its state lawmakers to raise hotel occupancy taxes to fund promotions for 
medical tourism. In contrast, for statewide policy, you can bring an initiative to any lawmaker, at 
which point public opinion and direct advocacy strategies may carry greater weight than who 
holds individual offices. 
The third theory is that direct advocacy (think: speaking to your representatives) can make a 
difference. This assertion holds true for issues with which legislators or other policymakers are 
unfamiliar. Ultimately, an advocate can influence policymakers’ beliefs, but only if the advocate 
comes well-informed in both the policy matter and the relevant political processes. 
Amid a defense of these three theories of effective advocacy, this thesis will seek to provide 
enough knowledge of political processes and behavioral health policy to start readers on the path 
to becoming an effective direct advocate. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Each one covers the recent history of a topic in Texas’ 
behavioral health policy. The chapters pull, from stories, lessons in effective advocacy. For a 
deeper knowledge in a specific policy area, readers should explore the “further reading” 
recommendations provided at the end of each chapter. The conclusion provides a cross-issue 
analysis of advocacy strategy. It also comments on how applicable the theories of effective 
advocacy will be moving forward, what issues may be ripe for change, and what future studies 
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could tell us about behavioral health advocacy. The first appendix provides a bill development 
timeline that guides advocates through the Texas Legislature’s unique biennial calendar. The 
second appendix provides a statistical breakdown of the bills passed during Texas’ 86th 
Legislative Session and lawmaker success rates. 
Research methods include interviews with policy professionals, a review of news articles, and 
secondary research in subfields of public policy and public health. Unless otherwise cited, the 
assertions made in this essay are my own observations, informed by a year and half serving as a 
legislative intern in Senator Zaffirini’s capitol office and several years volunteering in an 
indigent care clinic and state psychiatric hospital. Uncited claims made in the introduction, for 
example, draw heavily from my experiences and conversations with staffers in the Texas Senate. 
My thesis combines stories with facts and analyzes what both tell us about advocacy in Texas. 
This mixed-method format is popular in health policy commentaries written for the public. For 
example, T.R. Reid’s The Healing of America intertwines a comparison of health system models 
and Reid’s personal experiences seeking treatment around the world. Elisabeth Rosenthal’s 
American Sickness mashes the stories of patients with an explication of US health care 
economics.  
What is the value of mixing disciplines? Mathematics can demonstrate why medical device 
monopolies raise deductibles. An anecdote can convey why dependence on your spouse for 
health insurance creates an ugly power differential. Reid and Rosenthal make use of multiple 
disciplines to deliver a more robust look at the flaws of the US health care system. My thesis 




This focus situates my thesis somewhere between Mark Strand of the Congressional Institute’s 
Surviving Inside Congress and the League of Women Voters’ Texas Advocacy Playbook. The 
next seven chapters will study everything from legislative rules, to Texas politicians, to addiction 
treatment barriers. By approaching behavioral health advocacy from all angles, I hope to teach 
stakeholders how to make the most of their seat at the table. 
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Chapter 1: Entering the Arena, Alissa Sughrue, and NAMI Texas 
Alissa Sughrue grew up in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, a small city north of Tulsa. She attended 
primary and secondary school with the city’s rich and poor. She saw peers who lived in foster 
care speak up about their unmet needs, but not be taken seriously. They felt powerless, and she 
decided that one-day she would do something about it. Her dream was to become the Secretary 
of Education.1 Alissa completed her undergraduate degree in sociology and anthropology at 
Hendricks College in Arkansas. Her thesis covered gender inequities in science, technology, 
engineering, and math education.  
Alissa assumed the first step to working in public policy was enlisting for the front lines. She 
took an AmeriCorps position as the education liaison in a LifeWorks emergency shelter. 
Lifeworks provides housing and social services to youth experiencing homelessness in Austin, 
 
1 That dream lasted until Alissa realized, in her words, that “the position has to be purchased.” 
This chapter describes the work of NAMI Texas and one advocate, Alissa Sughrue, who 
carries out the organization’s work. The chapter aims to familiarize readers with the 
workers and culture of the Texas Legislature, while also dispelling the myth that effective 
political engagement requires any one type of expertise. Generalizing from Alissa’s story, 
the chapter makes three observations. 1.) For behavioral health stakeholders, there is 
value in showing up at the legislature at the right time. 2.) An advocate with a bill idea 
will find help turning it into policy from staffers and professional advocates. 3.) The 




Texas. There Alissa spent a year enrolling at-risk children in school before transitioning to a 
Youth Care Worker position. She worked essentially as a dormitory supervisor, analogous to a 
college Residence Assistant, but for 16 to 20-year-olds who would otherwise be living on the 
streets. She enforced rules, documented the resident’s whereabouts, organized activities, 
managed medications, ensured the kids had food, and cared for residents in crisis.  
After two years in that role, Alissa enrolled in a master’s program at the Steve Hicks School of 
Social Work at the University of Texas at Austin. She completed her degree and elected to break 
into Texas’ policy world. She started as a Policy Coordinator for the Texas Chapter of the 
National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI Texas) just before the start of the 86th Legislative 
Session.  
NAMI describes itself as a national organization “dedicated to building better lives for the 
millions of Americans affected by mental illness.” It is a grassroots community. Most of what 
NAMI does is on the local level, running workshops and support groups. Most of its funds go 
towards these local activities. The NAMI Texas chapter, a small crew of five, handles statewide 
administrative tasks and lobbying. They advocate for persons with mental illness and their 
families, as opposed to mental health care providers. 
At the start of the legislative session, NAMI Texas consisted of an Executive Director, Office 
Manager, Education Director, Policy Director, and a Policy Coordinator. Alissa described having 
both a Policy Director and Policy Coordinator as “a luxury.” Most advocacy groups were lucky 
to have one full time policy position. With two, NAMI Texas was one of the most active and 
therefore important mental health interest groups at work in the Texas Legislature. 
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Texas legislative offices are similarly light on staff. Most House of Representatives offices have 
just a Chief of Staff, a Legislative Director, and a handful of interns during session. 2 Like Alissa, 
most lobbyists and staffers are young, full-of-energy, and light on experience in Texas policy. At 
the end of the day, experience is valuable but not vital. Given the technical complexity of the 
legislative process, even the older staffers constantly learn on the job.  
When a bringing a policy idea forward to the Legislature, most advocates opt to speak with the 
staff of the representative and senator that represent them, or the legislator whose district is most 
impacted by the issue. If bringing a policy with a statewide impact, Alissa believes there is no 
ideal bill author. “I would not write-off a legislator just because they are not on the relevant 
committee or are a Democrat.” Often the legislators who do not hold any committee chairships 
pass the most bills because they make the fewest enemies. Committee chairs inevitably get the 
blame for killing hundreds of bills each session. Alissa does recommend finding a staffer who is 
passionate about your project and close with an experienced mentor.3 
“My name is Alissa Sughrue. I am the Policy Coordinator for NAMI Texas, and I stand in 
support of this bill.” 
 
2 As an intern in Senator Zaffirini’s office, I worked on a bill with the Executive Directors of 
Public Citizen and Sierra Club’s Texas chapters. We sought to update regulations from the 1960s 
to prevent above-ground hydrocarbon storage tank failures. Five representatives from the Texas 
Chemical Council, Texas Oil and Gas Association, and Texas Pipeline Association decided to 
pay my boss and myself a visit. They had a laundry list of issues with the bill. Their 
organizations also owned a number of above-ground storage tanks. Unknown to me at the time, 
this army of five constituted an intimidation tactic in the Texas Legislature. SB 1446 died in 
committee, killed most likely, as my mentor put it, because industry representation went to the 
committee chair’s office and explained behind closed doors why it was bad policy. 




Alissa arrived at the House Committee on Public Health hearing armed with facts. 
“Over a third of low-income women who experience [postpartum depression] don’t receive any 
kind of mental health treatment. Over half of women with perinatal depression are not 
diagnosed.” 
When questioned about the source of her facts in front of the Senate Committee on State Affairs, 
without hesitation Alissa gave the name of the report, the year it was published, and the name of 
the agency that published it. She and NAMI’s Policy Director were a dream team. They spent 
their days walking up and down the halls of the Capitol, briefing staffers and strategizing. At the 
end of each work-day, they started writing one-page briefs and testimony to prepare for the next. 
The work was tiring and non-stop, but meaningful.  
Then halfway through the legislative session, NAMI Texas’ Executive Director resigned. The 
Public Policy Director became the Interim Executive Director, and Alissa took on the Public 
Policy Director’s responsibilities, in addition to her 60-hour per week commitments as Policy 
Coordinator. She worked until midnight at least six days a week. She felt she “never really left 
work.” For staffers and advocates during a legislative session, this kind of work schedule is 
pretty typical. 
“There’s clearly a lot of thought put into preventing certain unintended consequences; however, 
without robust protections in place for the individuals being denied important treatment under 
this law, especially for mental health services, we strongly believe this [bill] will harm the few 




Alissa testified in support of nine bills and against one. She consulted with staffers on many 
others, including House Bill (HB) 10 and Senate Bill (SB) 10. These two bills drew much 
attention and controversy. They sought to create a child mental health “consortium.” To do so, 
the legislature allocated 100 million dollars to network the psychiatry departments of Texas’ 
robust system of medical schools. The appropriation may fund child and adolescent psychiatric 
telephone consultations and telehealth services, administered by this network. The composition 
of the consortium’s decision-making body heavily emphasizes psychiatry with little 
representation for the other mental health professional fields. While this fact ruffled some 
feathers, the bill was widely supported. All the relevant interest groups agreed that Texas 
desperately needed state-wide coordination of its behavioral health care systems and a child and 
adolescent psychiatry access program.  
This policy also formed a key component of the Governor’s school safety plan in the wake of the 
Santa Fe school shooting. The proposal was so important politically that both the Lieutenant 
Governor and the Speaker of the House made it a priority item, each assigning it one of the first 
30 bill numbers in their respective chambers. Despite having so many factors in their favor, 
neither HB 10 nor SB 10 survived the legislative process. 
Alissa talked with the staffers leading both bills through their journey. Mistrust between the 
House and the Senate permeated the process. In order for a bill to pass, it has to move through 
both chambers sequentially, providing the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, and a 
committee chair in each chamber the opportunity to kill the bill. HB 10 and SB 10 were 
originally very similar. They both flew their respective chambers of origin, but then stalled in the 
opposite. HB 10 was heavily amended by Senators so that it clashed less with their bill. As the 
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Senate pondered what exactly to do HB 10, House leadership stalled SB 10 to leverage the 
Senate to move their bill forward. This practice is called “chubbing” (Wallace 2019). 
 Especially toward the end of Session, committee chairs stalled numerous bills, as Alissa put it, 
“for no other reason than the other side not moving that committee chair’s bills.” The chambers 
played this game so long that the Senate ran out of time to hold a final vote on HB 10. The 
House brought SB 10 to a vote on the final day allowed, so late in the process that 
Representative Stickland, a hardline conservative from Bedford, managed to kill the bill with a 
parliamentary maneuver. Just before the midnight deadline, however, Representative John 
Zerwas, a Republican from Richmond, amended the entirety of SB 10 onto SB 11, a school 
safety bill that ultimately passed the House with 137 votes in favor and eight against. Governor 
Greg Abbott signed the bill into law on April 6, 2019. 
Alissa reiterated that everything she shared with me about the suspicion between the House and 
Senate was heard second or third hand. While hearsay, these types of rumors prompt action in 
the legislature. Information, right or wrong, flows quickly. This fact puts tremendous pressure on 
staffers. They are watched, prodded, and fearful of saying too little or too much about their boss’ 
intentions. They must maintain the trust of others, project competence and passion, and listen 
carefully for hints that a legislator may quietly suffocate their bill. At the end of the day, one 
staffer has little control over the legislative process. It feels a lot easier to get a bill killed than 
passed, and particularly in the field of health and human services, some of the policies at stake 




Just a few months before Session, Alissa got engaged. When session began, so did 60-hour work 
weeks. Meanwhile, Alissa’s fiancée worked full time and took night classes to earn her 
associates in computer science. When Alissa’s boss became interim director, Alissa’s 60-hour 
work weeks became 100 hours, and she and her fiancée stopped performing daily chores. The 
accumulating mess became a significant stressor.  
Texas policy circles hold that lobbyists and staffers divorce their partners at abnormally high 
rates, rates that spike during session. Alissa feels the capitol is like a different planet, and in my 
experience, your position becomes an important part of your identity. Rumors about legislators 
occupy your attention. You feel proud to be a piece on the chess board and go home at night just 
to think about how to protect your favored policy. Your friends and family did not live in the 
same world. Your interests and obsessions no longer overlap with theirs. 
Alissa and her fiancée made it through Session as strong as ever. Since her fiancée was almost 
equally busy, they put their lives on hold until Session ended. Afterwards, they deep cleaned 
their apartment and picked up where they left off planning their wedding. 
Alissa and SB 10’s stories illuminate several limitations of direct advocacy and a few strategies 
to succeed at it. Regarding limitations, this chapter shows the power of committee chairs and the 
lieutenant governor to kill legislation. If the relevant committee chair or the lieutenant governor 
opposes your bill, your best option is to try and change who holds the office.  
Advocates should also realize that, even before Session began, SB 10 was going to pass. During 
Session, advocates supported the bill, and individual representatives, like Rep. Stickland, tried 
their hardest to oppose it. None of that mattered. Senator Nelson (R-Flower Mound) did her 
homework well before Session. She designed the bill to leverage existing resources in academic 
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medical centers. Her bill responded to the current school shooting crisis, and she built a coalition 
that included every Senator and the Lieutenant Governor in support of it. There was a 
tremendous political current that ensured the bill would pass, and therefore little reason for an 
advocate to get involved once it had been filed.  
Effective advocacy brings new ideas to the attention of legislators. As far as lawmakers were 
concerned once Session began, the case of SB 10 was closed; however, very few bills have as 
much momentum as SB 10. Advocates can help legislators form opinions on the many issues 
about which they learn while in office. NAMI Texas proved there is value in doing so. With just 
two full-time employees, NAMI Texas wrote five bills, helped draft several more, and lobbied 
for or against 25 bills. While it is difficult to attribute a bill’s passage to one actor, Alissa 
believes at least six policies would not have become law without the work of NAMI.  
You do not need to work on policy full-time to see success, but if you want to be influential, first 
you have to show up and make yourself known to staffers. If you visit in the fall before the 
craziness of a session, I expect you will meet staffers and other advocates who want to hear your 














Frank, Richard and Sherry Glied. Better But Not Well. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.  
2006. p. 1-7; 91-103. 
 
I recommend just the book’s introduction and sixth chapter (titled “Policy Making in Mental 
Health).” These sections make a data-driven assessment of the United States’ mental health care 
system from 1950 to 2006. They introduce how the burden of disease, effectiveness of treatments, 
and financing & pricing of mental health services have changed over time. In chapter six, Frank 
and Glied describe the decline of specialty mental health policymakers as their job was cut up 
and distributed to numerous government agencies. The new mental health policymakers are state 
Medicaid directors, the Social Security commissioner, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
administrators, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The authors highlight the 
resulting lack of coordination in mental health policy. The work notably does not describe the 
importance of community behavioral health authorities and two key pieces of legislation passed 
after its publication. These topics will be explored in other parts of this thesis. 
 
Everett, Anita and Su Yeon Lee. “Community and Public Mental Health Services in the United  
States: History and Programs.” Public Mental Health. Ed. Eaton, William and the faculty,  
students, and fellows of the Department of Mental Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg  
School of Public Health. New York: Oxford University. 2012. p. 396-414. 
 
This chapter of Public Mental Health complements Better But Not Well by focusing on the role 
of community behavioral health organizations (CBHOs). The piece describes CBHO outpatient 
services and collaborative programs. It also addresses the challenges these organizations face 
today. While the chapter does not discuss the impact of the Affordable Care Act on CBHOs, it 
will nonetheless help readers understand the US mental health system’s greatest asset. 
Additionally, it provides a spark-notes style history of global mental health services 
development, from the 11th century Islamic Abassid Dynasty’s first asylum to 19th century 
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Chapter 2: Mental Health Care & Insurance Policy 
Advocates for expanding access to care in Texas have spent hours upon hours fighting uphill 
battles on insurance mandates, smart taxation, scope-of-practice laws, and funding for studies on 
X and Y issues. These policies generally have financial losers, either a trade group or the state, 
and as such are bitterly contested. Controversial bills rarely move in the legislature because the 
Speaker and Lieutenant Governor have no problem ‘filling the docket’ with uncontentious items. 
What makes this process particularly frustrating is that the same leadership refuses to advance a 
conflict-free, win-win item that would likely do more to expand access to care than any other 
proposal, all with little investment from Texas. 
Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, Texas has refused to expand Medicaid, 
even though the federal government would fund 90 percent of the expansion. As of July 2018, 
HealthInsurance.org reports that if Texas were to expand Medicaid, it would make Medicaid 
coverage available to an additional 1.6 million people, 600 thousand of whom have “no realistic 
access to health insurance” (Norris, “Texas and …”). Moreover, the new requirements or 
‘strings’ attached to the federal dollars would have increased enrollment of more than 500,000 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the current health insurance paradigm and its 
relation to barriers to receiving psychiatric care in Texas. With these issues in mind, the 
chapter examines the state’s “non-system” of safety net mental health care. By then 
focusing on an effort to improve access to care through the enforcement of mental health 
parity laws, the chapter will demonstrate the role of advocacy in the processes of policy 
implementation. Effective advocacy in this context extends beyond attending agency 
hearings and branches into community education and academic work. 
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children in Texas eligible but not enrolled in Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (Warner).  
In 2018, 17.7 percent of Texas residents had no health coverage – almost twice the national 
average of 8.9 percent (Fernández). To date, 36 US states and the District of Columbia have 
expanded Medicaid. In these places, Medicaid is a health insurance program for anyone with a 
low-income. In Texas and the 14 other states that have not expanded the program, adults can 
only qualify if you have if they have a low income and care for a child, have a disability, are 
pregnant, or have cervical or breast cancer (among a few other ways to qualify) (TxHHS, 
“Medicaid and …”). While this may seem reasonable on paper, when you look into the details, 
the absurdity of the eligibility criteria become clear. For example, an adult caring for a child that 
qualifies for Medicaid can themselves qualify for Medicaid only if they make less than $196 per 
month. Meaning, if the adult makes more than $2,353 per year, he does not qualify for Medicaid 
(TxHHS, “Medicaid for …”).1 
Yet barriers to accessing mental health care go well beyond access to health insurance. Colleen 
Horton, Policy Program Officer at the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, reported in 2016 that 
79 percent of Texas psychiatrists refuse to bill Medicaid. Additionally, 50 percent refuse to bill 
private insurance, instead requiring patients to pay out of pocket. While a low rate of 
 
1 One common dismissal of Texas’ abysmal insured rate is the argument that anyone can use the 
emergency room. While true that the federal government requires nearly all emergency rooms to 
offer emergency medical treatment regardless of a patient’s ability to pay, the scope of what 
emergency rooms must treat is narrow (CMS). Guaranteed treatment does not include, for 
example, pre and postnatal care, cancer treatment, or mental health care (Carroll). Moreover, 
patients still get charged for the emergency care they receive. Even Dallas County’s flagship 




reimbursement contributes to this issue, the simpler truth is that psychiatrists are in short supply. 
They can fill their schedules with patients who will pay out of pocket. In 2015, 185 out of Texas’ 
254 counties lacked a single psychiatrist, and 40 counties lacked even a licensed clinical social 
worker. This shortage is exacerbated for child and adolescent psychiatry (Colleen). In addition to 
most of rural Texas, El Paso, Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, parts of Dallas, and Houston are 
designated by the federal Health Resources and Services Administration as Mental Health 
Professional Shortage Areas. Where demand exceeds supply, patients must have cash to pay for 
mental health care, even if they manage to get off the waitlist and have private insurance.  
So what happens if you cannot pay out of pocket? Nearly 80 percent of US workers are living 
paycheck to paycheck, after all (Friedman). In Texas, responsibility for the mental health safety 
net is supposed to fall onto Local Mental Health Authorities and ten psychiatric hospitals run by 
the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (TxHHS, “State Hospitals”). In reality, these 
services are underfunded, and the largest safety net provider of mental health care is the state’s 
system of jails, although all major cities are broaching progress on this front.2  
Turning now to the extreme end of the unmet needs spectrum, every city has a population of 
high-need social service and penal system users. Almost thirty years ago, Pamela Diamond and 
Steven Schnee with the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health cast a light on this population and 
the cost of ignoring it for the rest of society. They found that just 21 men living on the streets in 
downtown San Antonio cost 17 different agencies a total of $1.5 million over 31 months, 
 
2 Some urban counties have established mental health courts to divert qualifying criminals to 
treatment. County and federal dollars fund these courts, and they have proven successful at 
decreasing recidivism. A lack of interested judges, however, currently slows the expansion of 
these programs (Murphy). 
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averaging out to $570,000 per year (adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor’s online 
calculator). Most of this cost was borne by the criminal justice system, but the other expenses 
were significant. A more recent study found that between 2003 and 2009, nine individuals living 
in the Austin area made 2700 emergency room visits, costing taxpayers three million dollars 
(AP). This cost is the product of an uncoordinated “non-system” of care (Diamond and Schnee).  
Advocates are trying to fill the gaps in the mental health care system from multiple angles and at 
multiple levels of government. Several bills have been introduced in both chambers of Congress 
that would increase the number of Medicare-funded residency positions in psychiatry, addiction 
medicine, and many other specialties. The passage of one of these bills would mark the first 
increase in the number of Medicare-funded residency slots since 1997 (AHA). Texas’ 2017 
Legislative Session saw the creation of an expedited licensing process meant to bring 
psychiatrists to Texas from other states (TMA). That same legislature strengthened Texas’ 
mental health parity laws, a new development in a 25-year-old movement. 
Mental health parity is the legal requirement that health insurance plans that cover mental health 
treatment offer these benefits ‘on par’ with medical and surgical benefits. This policy and the 
movement behind it will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.  
The first mental health parity law in the United States was passed by Congress in 1996. It applied 
only to large-group plans and did not cover substance use disorders. In 2008, Congress passed 
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), adding addiction treatment and 
general mental health care to the benefits that must be offered with no greater restrictions than 




The MHPAEA increased access to substance use disorder treatment in certain circumstances 
(Goodell), the use of autism spectrum disorder services (Stuart et al.), and individual financial 
protection; however, it did not significantly decrease out-of-pocket costs (Barry et al.). At the 
time of its passage, the act fell short in three respects from a patient’s perspective. First, the law 
did not specify how parity would be enforced. Second, it did not apply to individual and small 
group plans, and third, the law did not require that insurance plans cover mental health treatment, 
only that there be parity of benefits if mental illness is covered. At the time, coverage of mental 
health treatment was not a requirement. Moreover, in 2008, a mental illness diagnosis could still 
preclude you from purchasing a private insurance plan (Norris, “How …”). The issue of 
enforcement persists today. The issues of coverage and pre-existing conditions persisted through 
2013. 
Louis Norris, the health insurance and health reform authority for HealthInsurance.org, describes 
the difficulty of finding insurance coverage for mental health illness in 2013: 
A person with a bipolar diagnosis was unable to obtain private individual  
health insurance in most states. The same was true for people with schizophrenia  
and other psychotic disorders, anorexia, alcoholism, and a variety of other serious  
mental or behavioral illnesses. 
Even for people with relatively minor mental health diagnoses, health plans were  
allowed to increase premiums during the initial underwriting process. 
The underwriting rules that applied to mental health treatment often trapped people  
in the health plan they had when they were diagnosed, with no realistic opportunity  
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to shop around when annual rate increases were announced. And for people who  
were uninsured at the time of their diagnosis, securing coverage was challenging  
and expensive – or impossible, depending on where they lived. 
For those who had insurance, it often didn’t cover mental health care. According to  
a 2013 analysis conducted by HealthPocket, only 54 percent of individual health  
plans in the United State included coverage for substance abuse treatment, and 61  
percent covered mental health treatment. (Coverage was better among employer-
sponsored plans.)  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in 2010. In 2014, 
provisions of the law came into effect that extended mental health parity requirements to include 
individual and small-group plans. More significantly, the law prohibited insurers from 
considering pre-existing conditions in underwriting or enrollment decisions. It also required 
individual and small-group plans to cover ten “essential health benefits” with no dollar limits. 
These benefits include mental health and addiction treatment, prescription drugs, and behavioral 
assessments for children. Speaking generally, the ACA made coverage of behavioral health care 
mandatory and expanded behavioral health benefit parity requirements.  
The responsibility for enforcing mental health parity laws is distributed between multiple federal 
and state agencies (Goodell). The federal Department of Labor (DOL) has jurisdiction over self-
insured plans, including the majority of employer-sponsored plans. State insurance agencies 
enforce private insurance plan regulation (Norris, “What Is …”). In 2018 The DOL closed 115 
investigations subject to MHPAEA, citing 21 violations. When a violation is found in a 
particular insurance plan, the DOL requires the insurer to bring all similar plans into compliance 
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(a strategy called “voluntary global corrections”), as opposed to, say, levying a fine. The DOL 
does require plans to reimburse patient payment differences due to a quantitative treatment 
limitation. For example, the DOL required an insurer to reimburse a modest $26,000 in total to 
94 plan participants when it found a plan had higher co-payments for behavioral health 
outpatient visits than medical (EBSA). 
As you might guess, there are many barriers and limitations to enforcement.3 It is difficult to 
monitor health management organizations’ decision making processes, including those of 
Medicaid managed care programs. Insurance companies can still refuse to cover specific 
diagnoses and treatments that arguably fall outside of the ACA’s essential benefits; eating 
disorders are an example of a contested diagnosis. The MPHAEA does not apply to the minority 
of Texans on Medicaid who receive services solely under a fee-for-service model (as opposed to 
a managed care or hybrid model). Notably, the majority of this population is disabled and 
therefore at a higher risk of mental health and substance use disorders (Barry et al.). 
Furthermore, few organizations are capable of observing a discriminatory pattern of claims 
denials (or other patterns in treatment limitations), and depending on the state, these 
organizations may not have standing to sue (Goodell). Last and most significantly, in most cases, 
enforcement requires behavioral health consumers to report potential violations.  
“When consumers are denied coverage for substance use and mental health  
care, they are generally left to fend for themselves to defend their legal  
 
3 Before discussing these limitations, it is worth noting that only by the work of numerous 
researchers and advocates has the issue of parity enforcement come to the attention of policy 
makers. NAMI, for example conducted a highly cited survey in 2016, illuminating the 
“unfulfilled promise of parity.” Investment in research has kept mental health parity on the 
national political agenda; Former Vice President Joe Biden brought up a plan to expand mental 
health parity protections in the January 14, 2020 Democratic Presidential Debate.  
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rights. Rather than filing complaints with the state insurance department or  
attorney general, they generally turn their attention to figuring out how to  
immediately get their loved ones the help they need, even if it means facing  
financial ruin.” - Harris and Weber, 2018 
Effective enforcement requires that consumers know their rights and report violations. Toward 
this end, the Center for Public Policy Priorities is developing tools to help consumers identify 
violations, hosting webinars for community leaders, and leading public education efforts through 
Facebook and Twitter (CPPP, “Parity …”). Since enforcement requires consumers to file 
complaints, public education is an effective strategy to push for mental health parity. 
Advocates have also successfully prompted state legislative action. In 2017, Texas’ 85th 
Legislature recognized that the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) was unable to enforce 
parity laws in accordance with the updates made seven years prior by the ACA. The 85th 
Legislature strengthened state parity laws, empowered TDI to enforce them, created an 
ombudsman to help citizens file complaints with the appropriate agency, and created a 
workgroup to strategize for improving enforcement across the state (Villarreal). 
The workgroup consists of representatives from three state agencies, commercial health 
insurance plans, behavioral health providers, hospitals, the new ombudsman’s office, and 
consumer advocacy organizations, in addition to behavioral health consumers and their family 





Implementing parity laws requires the lived experience of consumers and knowledge of the 
bureaucracy of HHSC and TDI. It also relies on expertise in behavioral health treatments, the 
financing of treatment, and health law. No one person has all the necessary knowledge. People 
must work and learn together to devise a technical and fair process for identifying and punishing 
parity violations. This effort is an example of policy implementation. Implementation processes 
are open to the public. Anyone can join workgroup meetings, and reimbursement for travel may 
be available, depending on the workgroup. 
Yet, while subgroups of the larger parity workgroup iron out concrete policy recommendations, 
Texas’ Attorney General, Ken Paxton, leads an 18-state lawsuit aiming to abolish the entire 
Affordable Care Act (Norris, “Texas health …”). When it comes to health policy, Texas’ 
government has many brains pulling in opposite directions. 
For behavioral health providers looking to get involved in mental health parity, a good start 
would be to distribute brochures that encourage patients to reach out to the HHSC parity 
ombudsman if they think their insurance provider may be violating their parity rights. These 
materials have already been prepared and are available online at DontDenyMe.org. Providers can 
also record claims denial rates, pre-authorization requirements, and other treatment barriers. 
They can then compare the barriers with those observed by their colleagues in medicine and 
surgery and bring any differences to the ombudsman. Meanwhile, any behavioral health 





Returning to the three types of effective advocacy discussed in this thesis, public education to 
enhance mental health parity enforcement falls into the category of changing public attitudes. 
Regarding changing the mental health insurance paradigm, since the issue is so politicized, large 
scale reform will require changing who holds office. If someone wanted to prevent Attorney 
General Ken Paxton from contributing to the multi-state case to dismantle the ACA, for example, 
there is little to do except try to oust him in the 2022 election. On smaller issues like expanding 
state coverage mandates to eating disorder treatments, direct advocacy can play an important 
role. This chapter has shown policy and clinical expertise, as well as lived experience, are 
valuable in the process of policy implementation. One way for stakeholders to be effective 
advocates is to bring these types of knowledge to state agency workgroups. 
Further Reading  
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problems in systems coordination, cost-shifting, and early diagnosis. No prior familiarity with 
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Chapter 3: Mental Health in Schools & Budgetary Policy 
This chapter will start by tracing the history of the mental health in schools movement, before 
analyzing how a debate about the over-prescription of psychotropic medications fits into the 
broader historical narrative. The chapter will illustrate how this narrative influenced mental 
health in schools’ legislation during Texas’ 86th Legislative Session. Then, after a few comments 
on legislative attempts to fund school-based mental health care, the chapter will transition to a 
general discussion of budgetary politics in Texas. 
The placement of health and social services in school facilities first began around the turn of the 
20th century as a way to connect immigrants and other members of the urban poor with 
community resources (Emihovich and Herrington). Taken in the context of the Progressive Era, 
this effort was a natural outgrowth of the Settlement House and Labor movements as well as the 
urban political machines that used welfare to win votes. The school-based health center (SBHC) 
movement, if it could be called a movement at the time, was small and fragmented, led by a few 
localities in isolation.  
 
This chapter draws lessons in effective advocacy from the history of the mental health in 
schools movement, including the impact of school shootings. The chapter looks to the 
state’s response to these crises to launch a discussion of the structural and political 
factors in Texas’ budgetary processes. Last, the chapter advises advocates on framing 
and targeting political messaging when trying to secure state funding. 
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In the 1970s, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation catapulted the idea of an SBHC into public 
awareness, leading hundreds of school districts to partner with local health departments or 
hospitals to fund school-based health centers. Around this time, the United States dramatically 
reduced the incidence of many traditional childhood ailments, including tuberculosis, smallpox, 
and polio. School based health programs started to shift their focus to the “new morbidities,” 
those “induced by behavior.” Think violence by or against children, accidents, obesity, suicide, 
and sexual health, all of which correlate with poor academic achievement, thereby justifying 
SBHC involvement. While SBHCs continued to provide primary care and immunizations, many 
added health education and behavioral health care to their repertoire (Emihovich and 
Herrington).  
Momentum behind the SBHC has built from the 1980s to today. Federal funds began to flow to 
SBHCs in 1988 and expanded in 1997 via Medicaid payments. These payments have proven 
crucial in funding positions for school counselor and education for school staff in drug 
intervention strategies (Schubel). In 1995 the federal government began its direct involvement in 
the mental health in schools movement, starting pilot projects and a since-steady, though modest, 
flow of funds for research. In 2010 the Affordable Care Act created a federal grant program to 
fund the physical construction of an SBHCs in any district that would like one (Kilbreth and 
Ziller). Today, approximately 2000 SBHCs operate across the United States (HRSA), including 
around 100 in the state of Texas (TASBHC). 
The creation of an SBHC, however, is no walk in the park. A proposed SBHC requires the 
approval of multiple siloed bureaucracies, typically including the school district and local 
hospital district. Clinic funding comes from a mix of local, state, federal, and private insurance 
dollars, all of which require separate administrative procedures (Kilbreth and Ziller). Clinic 
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longevity depends on the continued support of school officials and is not a given. Longevity 
correlates positively with being in large, black, or progressive districts. Clinic longevity 
correlates negatively with being in southern or conservative districts, perhaps due to greater 
distrust of reproductive health initiatives (Rienzo et al.).  
SBHCs constitute just one of four delivery mechanisms for mental health in schools that 
predominate today. The other three are district mental health units, formal connections with 
community mental health services (and ideally “wrap-around” services for those with high need), 
and a social and emotional learning curriculum.1 The result of this decentralized approach is an 
unequal distribution of services and large gaps in care (Howard and Taylor). 
In Texas, the current system of school-based behavioral health care is fragmented, and the 
political movement is uncoordinated and in pursuit of piecemeal advances. State government 
involvement is limited to two programs. Regional “education service centers” train school staff 
in behavioral health, among other topics, and “coordinated school health models” promote access 
to counseling, psychological, and social services in school strategic planning. There are three 
important federal programs: In 2018 the Communities in Schools program foot the bill for case 
management and some mental health services for around 100,000 children in Texas to combat 
dropout rates (Hogg Foundation).2 The other two programs are Children’s Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program. These programs entitle any adolescent, legal US resident, 
 
1 These measures are distinct from special education services, which fall outside the purview of 
this chapter. 
2 For context: Texas had 5.4 million students enrolled in public schools that year (TEA). Around 
25 percent of Texas children live in households making below the federal poverty line, which is 
around $25,000 per year for a family of four (NCPP). Around 60 percent of public school 
students lived in households below 180 percent of the federal poverty line - $48,000 per year for 
a family of four (TEA). 
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whose family earns less than 200 percent of the federal poverty line, to public health insurance 
(TxHHSC). For the reasons discussed in chapter two, this entitlement does not equate with 
access to behavioral health services. 
The only students who are entitled to access to school-based behavioral health care are those 
who qualify for special education and have behavioral health needs listed in their Individualized 
Education Program plan. Advocates agree that much has yet to be done to address the unmet 
behavioral health needs of children and Texas would benefit greatly from statewide coordination 
of services (Hogg Foundation).3 
Political opposition to the mental health in schools movement has been significant and based 
partly on fair points. Chief among them are fears of over-pathologizing behaviors and over-
prescribing psychoactive medications. When I worked in the Texas Senate, my boss signed on to 
a bill that would advance research of and access to child and adolescent psychiatric care. A few 
weeks later, a concerned constituent, a mother, came in to talk about the bill. She declared her 
opposition to mental health in schools. I asked if she could be more specific, and she listed two 
concerns: (1) giving money to mental health care providers would be wasteful compared to 
spending it on playgrounds and green spaces and (2) bringing mental health into schools would 
exacerbate pill pushing. Two reasonable people could disagree on the first point. As to the 
second, whether psychotropic medications are over-prescribed to children is hotly debated.  
On the surface, the psychiatrists seem to have a strong defense. Many would blame high 
prescription rates on the reality that general practice doctors have to cover for an inadequate 
 
3 In recent years, successful advocacy efforts have pushed to lessen the use of seclusion, 




psychiatric workforce (RWJF), an issue that the bill would counteract. Moreover, recent research 
suggests prescribing patterns match psychiatric illness incidence rates (Sultan et al.). Yet critics 
respond to these arguments asserting that the diagnostic tools used by clinicians and researchers 
lead to false positives. They might say, for example, that the criteria for Attention-Deficit / 
Hyperactivity Disorder are too easy to satisfy and do not warrant treatment with medication. 
A closer assessment of the issue of over-pathologizing reveals a larger political conundrum than 
worries about pill pushing. The public and behavioral health providers see psychiatric diagnoses 
in very different lights. First, behavioral health providers cannot agree on what constitutes a 
psychiatric illness. Overgeneralizing for a moment, there is a fundamental ambiguity in 
psychiatric diagnoses that does not exist for diagnoses in other medical fields. Psychiatric 
diagnoses describe undesirable mental statuses, whereas other medical diagnoses describe a 
malfunctioning physiological process.4  
Behavioral health providers are comfortable with diagnostic ambiguity. The public does not 
understand it. Skilled behavioral health providers realize diagnostic codes rarely provide 
clinically relevant information. Psychiatric diagnoses are simply a common language for 
communicating about disruptions of the mental world. Good providers understand their limited 
applicability, but may offer them to comfort patients, please public health researchers, or satisfy 
billing requirements (McHugh).  
 
4 A quick comparison to demonstrate this point: We understand Parkinson’s disease to be, 
generally, the buildup of misfolded proteins in the brain. The disease can have several 
symptoms, and the diagnosis implies a certain treatment plan and prognosis. In contrast, a 
diagnosis of depression is just a description of impairment caused by or correlating with certain 
thought patterns. The diagnosis does not imply an internal pathology (think malfunction of the 
body), and the prognosis is much less certain than in the case of Parkinson’s disease. 
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In some cases, school-based diagnoses are inappropriately used to draw greater reimbursement, 
particularly in underfunded special education and mental health systems; however, the last thing 
providers want is for a diagnosis to shape a person’s future. They understand the potential harm 
of labels (typically). The political problem is that the public assumes providers do not, and the 
public fails to see the utility of diagnoses. The gulf between providers and the public can be 
difficult to bridge. Advocates should not expect the public to trust behavioral health providers, 
and effective advocacy in school-based behavioral health should seek, at least in part, to counter 
inappropriate labeling and build trust (Adelman and Taylor). 
The history of school-based health centers, fears of over-pathologizing, and lack of public 
understanding of behavioral health care practices all influenced mental health legislation in 
Texas’ 86th Legislature. In the wake of the Santa Fe high school shooting, Governor Greg Abbott 
released a three-pronged plan, calling, among many other things, for greater access to school-
based counseling services. House Bill 18 and Senate Bill 11 constituted the legislature’s 
response. These bills sought to increase awareness of adolescent mental illness and make 
existing resources go further. Despite political momentum, available funds, and existing school-
based health infrastructure, these legislative efforts came short of meaningfully investing in 
school-based mental health.  
House Bill 18 requires the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and Health and Human Services 
commission to disseminate best practices for a variety of behavioral health intervention strategies 
to school stakeholders. It encourages schools to incorporate this information into school strategic 
planning and partner with their local mental health authority to identify community supports. The 
bill also requires schools to report their mental health education practices to the TEA (Texas 
House), which will, in theory, allow researcher to study statewide practices for the first time 
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(Hogg Foundation). When the Legislative Budget Board placed a price on the piece of 
legislation, it noted but did not accept the Texas Council of Community Centers’ belief that the 
bill would require local mental health authorities to hire additional staff (LBB, “HB …”). We 
will return to this example of budgetary politics after a brief discussion of the other main mental 
health in schools bill passed by the 86th Legislature.  
Senate Bill 11 generally sought to educate parents, teachers, and students in preventive mental 
health practices, collect and use data to inform a future statewide planning process for enhancing 
student access to mental health resources, and provide immediate monetary assistance to schools 
to prevent school shootings. As filed, the bill proposed a grant program for school counselor loan 
repayment. This provision did not survive the legislative process; however, separate measures 
did fund psychiatric residency and child and adolescent psychiatry fellowship positions.5 SB 11 
may help the existing behavioral health workforce reach more children through its proposed 
child and adolescent psychiatry telemedicine program, to be funded and administered by the new 
Mental Health Consortium.  
As mentioned, SB 11 provides $50 million dollars annually to schools at a rate of $9.72 per 
student in average daily attendance to prevent school shootings. The schools must use these 
funds, per the LBB report, only for securing school facilities (“school hardening”), employing 
security staff, planning safety measures, or training staff in safety measures. Hidden in the bill, 
however, is a provision that gives schools discretion to use these funds on suicide prevention, 
intervention, and postvention – a decisive victory for behavioral health advocates. None of the 
documents most likely to be read by other legislative offices (the two committee reports and the 
 
5 This trade is one example of a strong tendency in the Legislature to defer to physicians and 
their wealthy trade organization, the Texas Medical Association, over other health professions. 
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LBB’s fiscal note) mention this point. The only references to mental health educational support 
talk specifically about suicidality and trauma-informed practices. This messaging turned out to 
be an effective strategy to increase funding of mental health school-based services.  
Before we further generalize and examine effective strategies in budgetary policymaking, this 
chapter will provide a brief background on Texas’ budget process. Texas’ budget totals around 
$110 billion per year (LBB, “Fiscal …”). The budget process begins in the fall before each 
legislative session, when the state agencies submit their budget requests to the Legislative 
Budget Board. The LBB is a nonpartisan government institution that consists of around 100 
analysts tasked with the job of managing the state government’s budget. These analysts also 
provide part-time legislators all the information necessary to craft the state budget. As we saw 
with the LBB’s decisions to exclude costs to local mental health authorities when pricing HB 18 
and exclude mention of SB 11’s funding for suicide-related programs in schools, budget 
estimations can be political. The Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House chair the LBB’s 
managing board. The board selects the executive officers of the 100-person office of analysts. 
Just recently, Lt. Gov. Patrick has sought to further politicize budget estimates by waging war 
against the LBB (and the “liberal bureaucrats” within it) with the end goal of completely 
replacing it (Patrick).  
After compiling state agency budget requests into a full, draft budget, the LBB submits the draft 
budget to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Finance Committee. Both 
chambers hold hearings on the budget and ultimately pass their own versions of a budget bill. A 
conference committee writes the final bill, and both chambers must approve it. Any lawmaker 
can submit a “budget rider,” a line-item appropriation. Riders can be added, amended, and 
deleted on the floor or by the conference committee.  
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Regarding control of this process: the Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the House set all 
committee appointments and chairships in their respective chambers and each pick half of the 
members of every conference committee. Therefore, they have tremendous influence over the 
budget. The next most powerful members are the chairs of the House Appropriations and Senate 
Finance committees, as they have a lot of power to stall or push forward the budget and budget 
riders. Legislative staffers believe that the chairs tend to fund their own initiatives before those of 
other lawmakers. 
There are a few other structural components to budgetary power. Texas’ constitution prohibits a 
state income tax and requires that the state maintain a balanced budget. Without an income tax or 
deficit spending, Texas is severely limited in its ability to fund new initiatives. Bills with price 
tags must include a novel funding source or support for dipping into a different program’s pot. 
For proposals that have a cost but should also yield state revenue or cost savings down the line,6 
the LBB fiscal note may determine their fate. Even a cost neutral fiscal note, however, does not 
guarantee success. The Office of the Comptroller can veto any appropriation that it deems in 
violation of the balanced budget rule.  
The governor also has the power to veto any line-item in the budget, and he enjoys, in 
coordination with the LBB, the power to move money between programs, and even between 
agencies, in between legislative sessions if a need arises (Texas Politics Project). 
 
 
6 For example: economic development policies could stimulate more income from sales tax and 




So, where does this leave you if you want to get an initiative funded by the state government? 
Many people will tell you the Texas Legislature is where bills go to die. If this is true for all bills, 
it is certainly true for bills that have a price tag. Unless you are a state agency asking for the 
funds needed to continue providing approved services, your bill has a much better shot at passing 
if it is revenue neutral. That means you need to find a specific funding source; maybe a federal 
grant or a forgotten state fund. You could also rely on downstream economic development or 
cost saving effects, but know that both rely on a generous adjudication by the LBB and 
Comptroller, two processes over which you have no control. If you cannot make a bill revenue 
neutral, you will have to meet a much higher bar for political support. The following table 
oversimplifies a complex political calculation, and as such should be taken with a grain of salt. 
Nevertheless, it provides a framework to begin thinking about how to target political messaging 
for initiatives that require significant sums of state money. 
 
Cost of the proposed program  
 
 
Active political support needed 
 
$1 - $5 million 
 




$5 - $50 million 
 




$50 - $100 million 
 
At least one member of the Big Three (the speaker of the 




$100 - $500 million 
 
At least all members of the Big Three 
 
 
$500 + million 
 
The public and the Big Three 
 
 
Any bill, but especially bills with a price, should be framed as necessary, rather than simply a 
good idea. You should bring the bill to legislators in the summer or fall before the legislative 
session. If you find there is a lot of interest in an initiative, but the enthusiasm comes just shy of 
the support needed to fund it, consider the time-honored tradition of advocating for a pilot 
program, and if it is implemented, work to expand it after the program has proven itself valuable. 
As we saw with mental health in schools bills in the 86th Legislature, you should stake your 
funding proposals to concrete goals that are easy for lawmakers to understand. Think suicide 
prevention, residency slots, and physical infrastructure. Make friends of the Texas Medical 
Association, chairs of the House Appropriations and Senate Finance committees, and, of course, 
Dan Patrick. Finally and of particular challenge in behavioral health, make sure your program 
can be easily and objectively evaluated based on results and, ideally, cost savings to the state. 
These strategies all relate to the larger theme that effective advocacy brings new ideas to the 
attention of policymakers. Framing an issue in a new light makes a difference. Unfortunately, 
budgetary policy is one area where the impact of direct advocacy is unlikely to be large. 
Budgetary policymakers have only a small pot of funds to distribute at their discretion, and the 
Lieutenant Governor and other key state officials have and exert tight control over budget 
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processes. Consequently, effective advocacy on budgetary issues may be limited to changing 
who holds these offices.  
That said, public opinion played a major role in forcing action after the Santa Fe shooting. 
Behavioral health advocates used this momentum to their advantage. The power of public 
opinion is clear, and it follow then that changing public opinion is effective advocacy. One 
specific strategy in this vein would be to build trust between the public and behavioral health 
providers, especially those that care for children. 
Further Reading 
On Mental Health in Schools: 
Adelman, Howard and Linda Taylor. Mental Health in Schools: Engaging Learners, Preventing  
Problems, and Improving Schools. Thousand Oaks: Corwin. 2010. 
Adelman and Taylor provide the historical and political background you should know before 
working on mental health project in a school. When providing advice to advocates, they tend to 
focus less on “how” and more on “why.” This style proves particularly effective when they 
discuss how to recognize and manage competing motivations in school stakeholders. Last they 
stress the importance of moving the Mental Health in Schools movement forward, creatively, and 
how stakeholders can contribute. 
Forman, Susan. Implementation of Mental Health Programs in Schools. Washington: American  
Psychological Association. 2015. 
Forman provides an excellent analysis of the current literature on school-based interventions’ 
efficacy and the political science of their implementation. She addresses the difficulty of 
translating evidence-based best practices into real workplaces and schools. She covers how to 
select interventions for your organization and community and also offers a step-by-step 
framework for overcoming institutional inertia. She includes guidance regarding program 
evaluation, adapting to and influencing larger systems, and ensuring program sustainability. 
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On classifying psychiatric illnesses: 
McHugh, Paul. “The Perspectives of Psychiatry: The Public Health Approach.” Public Mental  
Health. Ed. Eaton, William and the faculty, students, and fellows of the Department of  
Mental Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. New York: Oxford  
University. 2012. p. 31-40. 
This chapter of Public Mental Health will help those who do not provide mental health services 
understand how providers think about illness and problem solve. It also introduces the difficulty 
and complexity of studying psychiatric intervention effectiveness, especially in the high-
functioning subset of the mentally ill population.  
On the role of the Legislative Budget Board: 
Walters, Edgar. “Capitol insiders: Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick is letting the state’s  
budget agency fall apart.” The Texas Tribune. Oct. 29, 2019. Retrieved from  
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/10/29/texas-lt-gov-dan-patrick-wages-war-texas- 
legislative-budget-board/. 
This article covers the Legislative Budget Board’s functions during and in between legislative 
sessions. It also articulates the extent of the feud between the Board and Dan Patrick and 
comments on the possible implications of Patrick’s victory. 
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Chapter 4: Early Childhood Intervention and Lobbying 
On March 10, 2017, Texas State Representative Rick Miller (R-Sugar Land) filed a bill on behalf 
of behavioral health therapists working out of the same office building as his district staff. The 
bill would have required private insurance plans to provide greater coverage for early childhood 
therapy. Two months later, Rep. Miller and his building-mates testified in support of this 
progressive legislation in front of the Texas House Committee on Insurance. These events were a 
satisfying example of representative democracy working as intended: constituent needs 
triumphed over political ideology. The bill never got out of committee, but that same legislative 
session, House Speaker Joe Straus (R-San Antonio) charged the Texas House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Health and Human Services with studying the Early Childhood Intervention 
program and its financial difficulties. The interim study revealed the following wealth of 
information. 
The 1975 federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires all states to 
provide free and appropriate special education to individuals with disabilities. It also provides 
grants to assist in the voluntary implementation of early intervention services for children three 
years of age or younger (Committee on Appropriations).   
This chapter explicates the Early Childhood Intervention Program’s financial crisis in a 
manner parallel to how Texas legislators learned of it. The chapter then describes the 
development of two policies meant to address the crisis. As the story unfolds, I hope to 
show how the legislature works with incomplete information. Last, using the politics 
surrounding these bills as a backdrop, this chapter offers lessons in lobbying. 
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Since 1993 Texas has provided Early Childhood Intervention Services (ECI) to all eligible 
children. ECI offers case management, assistance with referrals, and the creation of an 
Individualized Family Service Plan. ECI therapists visit family homes, evaluate the child, and 
teach the family how best to work on improving their child’s condition during daily activities. 
Examples of the range of illnesses treated include the effects of trauma, being born without a 
hand or foot, a fear of playing with other children on the playground, and intellectual or 
developmental disability. The goal of these visits is to teach parents to provide daily therapy so 
their children can develop alongside their peers (Committee on Appropriations).  
Pediatricians across the state rely on ECI. They are, in fact, required to refer children with 
intellectual or developmental disability, visual deficiency, or auditory deficiency to ECI. Texas’ 
foster care system also relies on ECI. In addition to all its other services, ECI is the frontline for 
kids younger than three who have suffered trauma or been exposed to addictive substances; ECI 
is the mental health authority for kids age zero through three (TxHHS, “Early …”). “Studies 
have shown that early childhood education programs have long-term beneficial effects on 
cognition, language, academics (reading and math), and youth behavior” (Purugganan).  
Texas’ ECI program serves around 50,000 kids per year. 67 percent of service users have 
Medicaid and are thus exempt from out-of-pocket costs. The rest of the families pay for services 
on a sliding scale that considers insurance reimbursement and family financial status. No family 
can be denied the services outlined in their Individualized Family Service Plan due to an inability 
to pay. Consequently, the state ECI program (using state and federal dollars) frequently picks up 
the tab (LBB, “Financing Options”).  
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Federal funding for Texas’ ECI program comes from the U.S. Department of Education. Despite 
the requests of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, the U.S. Department of 
Education would not consider an increase in funding for the state’s ECI program. Unlike typical 
entitlement programs, federal funding for ECI is not distributed on a per-capita basis, but rather 
like a fixed block grant. For this reason, as Texas' population has increased, ECI providers have 
received fewer dollars per child and struggled to make ends meet. ECI providers are 
organizations that contract with the Texas Health and Human Services Commission to provide 
services to all eligible children within a region of Texas. They are contractually required to see 
all kids who qualify for services within their region; yet the state can only reimburse these 
services until funds run out (Committee on Appropriations).  
HHSC reports that of ECI providers in fiscal year 2017: 66 percent delayed hiring staff, 55 
percent delayed system upgrades or equipment purchases, 45 percent reduced efforts to find 
children in need, 45 percent downsized staff, and 23 percent reduced staff benefits in order to 
continue to meet their obligation to serve all eligible children. Not all providers have succeeded 
in making ends meet. Texas has lost a net of 16 provider organizations since 2010 (6 since 
2016), bringing the total number down to 42 (Committee on Appropriations).  
As providers drop their contracts with the state, the remaining providers are required to take over 
their clients, which increases costs for the remaining providers. Two regions will shortly lose 
their ECI providers without a contracted replacement. HHSC representatives testified that the 
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state may be sued as a result, since HHSC must maintain access to ECI services for all eligible 
children, without a waitlist, to comply with federal regulations (Committee on Appropriations).1  
In 2012 HHSC, faced with a similar predicament as today, decided to toughen the eligibility 
requirements for ECI services. HHSC testified in front of the House Appropriations Committee 
that this decision decreased access to care and increased downstream costs to the special 
education system as well as in the areas of criminal justice, health care, and other social services. 
Black children disproportionately lost access to ECI after this rule change (TxHHS, 
“Presentation …”). 
Today the ECI program is still in jeopardy, and Texans are suffering as a result. Providers are 
overwhelmed and their situation is worsening. Texas could again heighten eligibility criteria, 
decreasing enrollment in the program to make ends meet. If they do not, the collapse of the 
program is a possibility and would be expensive for both the state and its citizens (Committee on 
Appropriations).  
The interim study that brought to light this wealth of information on the ECI program was led by 
Representative Sarah Davis (R-Houston) and resulted in her filing House Bill 1295. The bill 
received a preliminary $370 million dollar price tag (a “fiscal note” that was never made public), 
even though HHSC had evidence that the program was revenue neutral (or arguably beneficial) 
when factoring in how the ECI program reduces need for special education services.2 Yet the 
 
1 There is a rich history of federal courts forcing the state of Texas to improve public health 
services, including cases that forced the state to spend more money on Medicaid services for 
children (Warner, “Texas.”); however, a lawsuit may not have this effect. In response to a 
previous program budget shortfall in 2012, for example, HHSC simply toughened the eligibility 
requirements for ECI services. 
2 Texas Health and Human Services based this judgement on data obtained from one provider of 
both ECI and special education services, the Katy Independent School District (Committee on 
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Legislative Budget Board had made its calculation, and since Texas’ government must have a 
balanced budget, per its constitution, Davis would have to come up with a way to pay for the bill. 
Instead, however, she decided to cut a provision that would have mandated automatic Medicaid 
enrollment for certain children (in addition to a few other high-dollar items) and re-file the bill.  
While Rep. Davis had to gut part of her bill, she and her staff (primarily a public affairs graduate 
student named Leila Al-Hamoodah) did not give up on it. Rep. Davis successfully lobbied the 
Speaker of the House, Dennis Bonnen (R-Lake Jackson), to make the new bill a priority item. 
Accordingly, it received one of the first 30 bill numbers: House Bill 12.  
At this point, I had gotten involved in various efforts to stabilize the ECI program’s finances. I 
ended up working on a legislative proposal that Senator Zaffirini file the Senate companion bill 
to HB 12. As filed, the bill had eleven parts. The most significant sections were an insurance 
coverage mandate and expansion of Medicaid eligibility for children, meant to draw additional 
private and public funds into the ECI program. In the process of vetting the bill, I reached out to 
ECI providers, impacted state agencies, and the foreseeable opposition, the Texas Association of 
Health Plans (TAHP).3 TAHP represents both private and public insurance plans and its 
feedback was distressingly technical. Apparently, the bill “could” cause conflict with everything 
from Texas’ telemedicine scope-of-practice law to the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).4 TAHP officially fought back against the insurance mandate 
provisions, saying they would raise costs for consumers. TAHP also argued about our 
 
Appropriations); however, academia has not reached a consensus on these cost savings effects 
(Warner, Personal …). 
3 Other stakeholders include independent school districts and the Texas Pediatric Society. 
4 I learned in a later conversation with the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health’s Executive 
Director that pressing potential conflict with HIPAA is a common strategy for defeating health 
policy initiatives, regardless of a bill’s actual relation to the federal act. 
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assessment of what was and was not currently covered, even under state run plans. Some of their 
critiques I could verify myself, such as the potential cost to state run health plans and the 
potential for conflict with other laws, but others (like claims about what “may” currently be 
covered) I could not. TAHP seemed careful to couch almost all of its written talking points in 
uncertain terms like “could” and “may.” 
TAHP’s lobbyist, however, was genuinely helpful. He seemed eager to help us fix potential 
problems with the bill. He told me that we should not worry too much about industry opposition. 
TAHP’s blanket policy is opposition to insurance mandates. The real issues lay in how the bill 
would impact public plans.  
“The best lobbyists ‘provide really good information, ideally very quickly, and  
capitalize on what you already want to do – not something that’s bad for you or  
your [legislator]. If they try to spin you, as opposed to giving good, straightforward  
information, that’s not good … and their reputation will decline, fast.”  
– a senior US Senate staffer, as cited by Kersh 
Leila took the lead on addressing TAHP and others’ concerns, or at least those that seemed to 
hold water. The Senate companion bill was not given a hearing because HB 12 seemed to be 
progressing smoothly. HB 12 ultimately passed the House with 132 votes in favor and 10 
against. Per legislative procedure, the bill then moved into the Senate. The Lieutenant Governor 
should have then referred the bill to the appropriate Senate committee, but he never referred the 
bill to any committee. The rumors maintained the Lieutenant Governor was punishing Davis for 
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opposing his school voucher legislation during the previous legislative session.5 At this point, it 
was too late to hold a hearing on the Senate companion bill. The next time I talked with Leila, 
she was crestfallen. 
The ECI program’s funding crisis did not have the public’s attention. Perhaps for this reason, the 
Lieutenant Governor was able to suffocate HB 12. Yet the lack of attention may have also 
permitted Rep. Davis and the Speaker of the House, Dennis Bonnen, to pass a bill through the 
conservative Texas House with new mandates on private insurance. Depending on your 
perspective, the bill ultimately died because Dan Patrick killed it or because Rep. Davis, rightly 
or wrongly, chose to pick a fight with him. Either way, the bill’s death demonstrates the 
importance of who we elect to key positions. It also shows the importance of staying on the 
good side of the Lieutenant Governor, as someone who brings ideas to legislators. The next 
story focuses on a bill with a more typical course through the legislative process and the 
advocate who fought for it. 
Lauren Rangel, mother of three, has a deep, personal commitment to disability advocacy. Two of 
her young children have an Autism Spectrum Disorder diagnosis. During the 86th Legislature, 
she worked for Easterseals Central Texas as a Public Policy Fellow. The Texas Council for 
Developmental Disability funded her position. As ECI providers, Easterseals included, struggled 
to stay afloat, they reduced “child find” activities. Consequently, places like Travis and Harris 
Counties saw a 20-35 percent decline in ECI enrollment. Lauren brought her idea for a policy 
solution to Senator Zaffirini’s office. She wanted to direct the Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission to apply for federal funding to pilot a 211-screening service that would combat the 
 
5 The passage rate of Rep. Davis’ bills was 13.8 percent, compared to 48.5 percent for other 
Republican committee and subcommittee chairs (see Appendix B for methods). 
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enrollment decrease. Senator Zaffirini’s staff, with the help of Texas Legislative Council staff, 
drafted and filed the corresponding bill, SB 1955. 
During Session, Lauren fell seriously ill. Nonetheless, she would regularly call into the Senator’s 
office to discuss bill language. Managing illness, she also cared for her three young children and 
pushed a host of other bills related to disability care and rights. Despite her hard work, a clear 
need for SB 1955, and the bill’s $0 price tag, the bill never received a hearing.  
While the stories of HB 12 and SB 1955 might seem like failures, they represent progress. Every 
member of the Texas House learned of the issues facing the ECI program. Moreover, Rep. 
Davis’ policy now has a record of bipartisan support, which will expedite its future movement 
through the legislative process. Lauren’s bill caught the attention of the Health and Human 
Services governmental relations department and may resurface as part of a future legislative or 
agency-led initiative. 
The timescale for setting public policy is years to decades. Persistence is key, but it can be 
difficult. Leila left Texas for another job. I will leave Austin for medical school, and the grant 
that funds Lauren’s position will run dry in a few months. Lauren hopes Easterseals will find 
funding for her position by another means, but even if not, she knows she will continue with 
disability advocacy in one way or another. For now, Lauren is pushing to fund her 2-1-1 pilot 
program through a Pritzker Foundation grant. 
While private lobbyists have the advantage of expertise and job stability, public interest 
advocates have their own advantages. For starters, there are many people willing to donate their 
time to a good cause. When an advocate must move away from the legislature or legislative 
work, advocacy networks can ensure someone will pick up where they left off. Finally, when 
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trying to effect change, as we saw with the two policies responding to the ECI crisis, there are 
numerous ways to go about it. Effect advocates hoping to bring their ideas to policymakers 
seek help, listen to feedback, approach problems from every angle, and persist through failure. 
Further Reading 
Mendelson, Tamar, Pas, Elise, Leis, Julie, Bradshaw, Catherine, Rebok, George, and Wallace  
Mandell. “The Logic and Practice of the Prevention of Mental Disorders.” Public Mental  
Health. Ed. Eaton, William and the faculty, students, and fellows of the Department of  
Mental Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. New York: Oxford  
University. 2012. p. 459-509. 
This chapter of Public Mental Health covers evidence that prevention methods work and yield 
benefits over an individual’s lifetime. It breaks down prevention strategies by disease and 
population. The chapter has large sections on family-level preventive interventions, written from 
the perspective of a health authority. It also covers interventions at the school level, including 
for pre-school. Last, the authors identify key challenges and opportunities in mental illness 
prevention moving forward.  
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Chapter 5: Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness 
The purpose of this chapter is not to conflate homelessness with mental illness. The homeless 
community is diverse. Some individuals experiencing homelessness have been on the street for 
decades. Some just started living out of their vehicles after, for example, being hit with a major 
medical bill. Many homeless individuals are mentally healthy. Many suffer from depression and 
anxiety but are naturally less concerned with their mental hygiene than finding food and shelter. 
And some have a serious psychiatric condition that must be managed for them to get back on 
their feet. This chapter focuses on the challenges of providing care to the last group. 
The Austin State Hospital (ASH) serves patient who have been ostracized by society and 
struggle with a high level of impairment. As a public psychiatric hospital, ASH provides 
necessary psychiatric services to any Texan. ASH officially serves adults from 38 counties and 
youth from 75. In reality, ASH takes patients from all over Texas. ASH maintains 252 beds, all 
of which are full year-round. Many of the patients are there for “competency restoration” so that 
they can stand trial. Those who cannot get to the front of the 100-person queue for one of ASH’s 
beds must wait, often in a hospital bed or jail cell (UTADMS).  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe two complicating elements that distinguish 
mental health policy for individuals experiencing homelessness from general physical and 
mental health policy. The first element is the complexity of both the illnesses and their 
successful treatment. The second is the scare factor associated with the patient 
population. By understanding the unique needs of these individuals and the ways that the 
public and lawmakers view them, advocates can develop more effective strategies for 
improving Texas’ mental health care system for everyone. 
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Meanwhile, “approximately 70 patients essentially live at ASH” in the extended-stay unit, where 
I volunteer occasionally (UTADMS). The patients in this unit could not function on their own, 
and they have no family or social support outside the hospital, otherwise they would not be given 
one of ASH’s limited beds.  
A 20-year-old patient in the extended-stay unit told me that she would soon have to leave the 
hospital and go to a group home. She was not excited but thought the alternatives, “returning to 
her family or returning to prison,” were worse.  
The extended-stay unit houses individuals from approximately 18 years of age to 70 with 
conditions that range from suicidal ideation to intellectual or developmental disability. Often the 
patients have multiple mental health conditions and comorbid physical ailments, in addition to a 
criminal record. 
On another visit to ASH, I spent about an hour coloring with a woman in her 50s. She would 
repeat the same question four or five times, and I would answer respectfully, trying to provide 
the same answer in different words each time. 
“Where do you go to school?” 
“Just down the street, at the University of Texas.” 
After about 45 minutes, she managed to answer one of my questions about her hopes. She 
wanted to be a college student at the University of Texas at Austin. She began to talk also about 
her past. It was not an uplifting story, but a highlight for her was that she had had five children. I 
worried she might one day realize she could not be a student, that she could not have the life she 
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envisioned living at the University, and I worried more so for her children. Yet frankly, that day 
might not come, and the children might not really exist. 
For some patients with severe psychiatric conditions and nowhere else to go, ASH provides, in 
its own, unofficial way, palliative care, rather than rehabilitative therapy. Unfortunately, the 
patients receiving this care are still encouraged to leave the hospital to free up a bed for another 
individual in need. ASH sends the patients typically to group homes that, according to one 
member of ASH’s staff, rarely provide an appropriate level of care. At these homes, many 
patients feel taken advantage of, and some stop taking their medications or lose access to them. 
Some patients then end up homeless. The bravest may travel downtown to be near homeless 
resource centers, including CD Doyle, but many (especially the women) avoid the area, fearing 
for their safety. 
Mental illness in the homeless population can seem like an unsolvable crisis, certainly in part 
because these illnesses may stem from a lifetime of unmet social needs and trauma. When mental 
health conditions manifest as dramatic changes in behavior, they are like “end-stage” illnesses. 
They would have been easier to treat years in the past, and at this point, treatment options are 
limited. What treatments do exist (e.g. antipsychotic drugs) often carry strong side-effects 
(weight gain and a feeling of mental haziness) that discourage their use. Not to mention, these 
drugs must be taken indefinitely to manage the symptoms of the illness (NIMH). 
The bottom line is that severe psychiatric illness in the homeless population is difficult and 
expensive to treat. Effective treatment would address social ails, the root causes of the illness. 
The city of Austin and its health ecosystem are hard at work toward this end. In September 2019, 
Integral Care finished building an apartment complex for the homeless that includes both a 
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health care clinic and employment and social services. It will house 50 individuals, putting the 
total number in Integral Care’s housing programs at 500. Despite this progress, as of 2019, there 
are at least 2,200 individuals still experiencing homelessness in Austin. The complex is the 
product of a larger movement in public health to provide “housing first” to care ultimately for 
debilitating substance use and mental health disorders (Winkle). 
The City of Austin has recently attacked the issue of homelessness from another angle: 
“decriminalizing poverty.” Noting that many homeless individuals cannot land a job because 
they have criminal records for panhandling or camping in public locations, the City Council 
decriminalized these activities. To many in the public health field, these measures were common 
sense; however, downtown stakeholders campaigned against them fiercely. After the Council 
approved the measures, the University of Texas Police Department Chief came out against it, 
citing concern for the safety of students (Torre). 
At work in this resistance is a pervasive scare factor. An Austin State Hospital staff member 
once commended my volunteer group because we were not afraid of the patients, unlike all the 
other groups. But it is reasonable to be afraid. ASH employees routinely have to restrain violent 
patients who have, for example, destroyed frontal lobes and zero impulse control. Moreover, in 
2016, a University of Texas student was killed walking home from class. Two years later, a jury 
found a then-homeless, 20-year-old man guilty of murdering her (McCausland). At CD Doyle, I 
interviewed a homeless patient worried about a skin condition. He went through our process 
calmly, walked outside the clinic after receiving treatment, and knocked a man standing on the 
street to the ground before kicking his head against the curb, for no apparent reason. 
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The vast majority of homeless individuals with whom I have worked have been sweet and not in 
the least bit violent; however, individuals considering work with the homeless ought to be 
prepared for the worst. They also need to be ready to direct patients to regional free medical 
services, housing services, and other social services. Moreover, anyone looking to get involved 
in mental health policy needs to understand mental illness in the homeless population. 
Individuals experiencing both homelessness and severe psychiatric conditions are often the most 
visible members of the mentally ill community. They color the public’s perceptions of a variety 
of issues. For this reason, mental health advocates ought to educate themselves on the realities of 
mental illness in this population and include these individuals in conversations to improve our 
mental health care policy.  
In simpler terms, these strategies will make advocates better prepared when bringing new ideas 
to legislators. Another way to approach advocacy in homeless policy is to combat the influence 
of the scare factor. By changing the public perception of individuals experiencing 
homelessness, advocates can decrease resistance to innovative housing and health policy. 
Returning to the story of Austin’s decriminalization policy, the University of Texas police 
department turned out not to be the most vocal opponent. On Twitter, Governor Abbott began a 
multi-month tirade against the Austin City Council. Abbott also directed the Texas Department 
of Transportation to clear homeless encampments under state highways that run through Central 
Austin. While homeless advocates were frustrated by Abbott’s response, they were more-or-less 
happy with his results, as were the affected homeless individuals (Tatum). 
Abbott offered a state-owned empty lot, far away from downtown (and social services), for 
homeless individuals to set up tents (Tatum). At no cost to those living there, the public camp 
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now offers three meals a day, and a state trooper provides 24/7 security. The camp was just the 
first of Abbott’s helpful actions. Several months and many angry tweets after the whole debacle 
began, Abbott instructed the Department of Public Safety to add patrols in downtown Austin and 
around the University of Texas (Garnham). Currently, a nonprofit funded by the Austin business 
community is partnering with Abbott to create a new, permanent shelter in place of the public 
camp. The organization aims to provide 300 beds, although only about 140 individuals currently 
sleep at the camp (Tatum and Andu). 
Abbott interjected himself into an ongoing conversation between homeless advocates, local 
business leaders, and city police. One take-away from this story is that homeless policy balances 
the priorities of these three groups. Advocates in Texas should also see that top state officials 
consider haranguing Austin’s city leaders a favorite pastime. These state officials, however, are 
not all talk. While Abbott’s criticism has so far led to constructive policy, the Legislature has a 
long history of simply overturning Austin’s city ordinances (Jankowski). 
Further Reading 
Hooks, Christopher. “Street Fight: Inside Austin’s Bitter Brawl Over Homelessness.” Texas  
Monthly. Nov. 2019. Retrieved from https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/austin-brawl- 
homeless-population/. 
This article covers the reasons for the Austin City Council’s decriminalization ordinances and 
the public resistance that followed their passage. The article also highlights the impact of the 
changes on homeless individuals, the role of misinformation in opposition campaigns, and 
tension between the city council and police department.  
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Agus, Deborah. “Mental Health and the Law.” Public Mental Health. Ed. Eaton, William and the  
faculty, students, and fellows of the Department of Mental Health, Johns Hopkins  
Bloomberg School of Public Health. New York: Oxford University. 2012. p. 351-380. 
Agus offers first a broad discussion of the US legal system before zooming in on salient topics. 
These topics include: 1. mental health law and the rights of children; 2. how courts handle minor 
criminal charges in relation to treatment; and 3. the problems with mental health and drug 
specialty courts.  
Stuckey, Skyler, Levin, Marc, and Kate Murphy. “Enhancing Public Safety and Saving Taxpayer  
Dollars: The Role of Mental Health Courts in Texas.” Texas Public Policy Foundation.  
April 2015. Retrieved from https://files.texaspolicy.com/uploads/2018/08/16100821/PP- 
The-Role-of-Mental-Health-Courts-in-Texas.pdf. 
Written by an Austin-based conservative think tank, this piece does not try to provide a balanced 
take on mental health courts, but rather advocate for their expansion. The article is worth 
reading because it discusses evidence for the success of these courts in reducing recidivism. It 
also provides information on the history of these courts and data on the current extent of their 
use in Texas. 
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Chapter 6: Addiction & Central Health  
I know persons who have been opium-eaters for some years who now daily  
consume enough of this poison in the form of morphine to kill a half dozen robust  
men not used to the poison. I have heard them, with tears in their eyes, say that  
they wished it had never been prescribed for them … -W.G. Rogers, 1884 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) estimates that “abuse of tobacco, alcohol, and 
illicit drugs [exacts] more than $740 billion annually in costs related to crime, lost work 
productivity and health care” in the United States. Addiction has gained salience in recent years 
due to the opioid epidemic: a crisis, as journalist Beth Macy describes, created by pharmaceutical 
advances, maleficent or misguided physicians, and the criminal company Purdue Pharma. Yet 
despite recent devastation and public attention, not to mention centuries of awareness of 
addiction, no silver bullet has surfaced.  
Opioid use disorder is a particularly devastating addiction, and treatment options leave much to 
be desired. According to NIDA, opioid use disorder is “chronic and relapsing.” In common 
terms, dependency and craving for the effects of opioid drugs plague the affected mind for not 
months or weeks, but decades. Medication can reduce cravings, but it must be taken daily and for 
the rest of the patient’s life. NIDA reports that when patients stop taking medication “relapse 
rates are high … even when the medication is tapered and patients are highly motivated to stop 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the difficulties of managing opioid addiction 
from the perspectives of a health care provider and public health official. The chapter 
gives concrete examples of steps that can be taken to address social determinants of 
behavioral health and underlines the importance of advocacy efforts within a health 
system. Last, the chapter argues that, as demonstrated by the work of Central Health, 
effective advocacy starts with a problem and pursues every policy lever to combat it. 
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opioid use.” Though the risk of relapse does decrease with time, the goal is managing the 
symptoms as opposed to curing them, or in certain cases even replacing the illegal addiction with 
daily, supervised use of a legal drug, such as methadone (NIDA, “Office-based …”).1  
Overcoming addiction, on an individual level, poses an immense challenge. It should be no 
surprise that so does addressing addiction from a policy perspective. Some cities particularly 
hard hit by the opioid crisis have considered dramatic measures, such as opening supervised 
injection sites. These facilities seek to mitigate the public health risks of intravenous drug use. 
Critics argue that they attract drug users to the community in which the site resides (Laslo 2019). 
These sites aim to provide a point-of-contact between drug users and social services; however, as 
discussed in chapter five, even robust social service networks struggle to offer the 
comprehensive care that many users need.  
Advocacy in the field of substance use disorders has been hampered by significant cultural bias 
against medication assisted therapies, an ideology that favors criminality over treatment, and 
division within the “treatment camp,” namely a rivalry between “12 step program” and “harm 
reduction” advocates (Macy). Furthermore, arguments over who deserve blame for the opioid 
crisis may have contributed to a slow response on the part of the federal Drug Enforcement 
Agency (AP), the American Medical Association, and Purdue Pharma (Macy).2  
 
1 “[40] to 60 percent of addicted opioid users can achieve remission with medication-assisted 
treatment, according to 2017 statistics, but sustained remission can take as long as ten or more 
years.” It take an average of roughly eight years, once treatment starts, to achieve one year of 
sobriety. “Meanwhile, about [four] percent of the opioid-addicted die annually of overdose” 
(Macy, p. 45). 
2 Fun fact: Back in 2001, when Purdue Pharma first came under fire for its role in spreading 
opioid addiction, the company hired none other than New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani to 
bolster its reputation with Republican lawmakers (Macy). 
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Given the difficulty of treatment, the stigma associated with substance use disorders, and 
national hesitation on policy intervention, it is easy to see why the Texas government might 
chose to avoid the issue. And yet, it has not done so. In 2019, the Texas Legislature created 
continuing education requirements to keep prescribers of pain medication up-to-date on best 
practices, limited the quantity of opioids they can give with one prescription, expanded 
reimbursement for addiction treatments, and provided limited supplies of the overdose-reversing 
drug Naloxone to first responders (HB 3285, HB 2454, and HB 2174). 
So, we have seen Texas expand care for those currently living with addiction, but to what extent 
is Texas trying to prevent addiction? 
In the spring of 2019, Austin Mayor Steve Adler and Austin Councilwoman Kathie Tovo visited 
an undergraduate seminar at the University of Texas at Austin and asked several of my 
classmates for help with this goal. The pair knew the opioid crisis had not hit Austin in full force, 
but that it was coming. They wanted the students to research how to get ahead of the crisis and 
share with them what they learned. While this assignment was an exercise in writing white 
papers, it was also a real issue for Austin’s city leaders. Adler and Tovo recognized they had an 
opportunity to get ahead of the incoming disaster, but felt unprepared to seize it.  
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), National Institute 
on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids recommend three methods to 
prevent substance-use disorders (SUDs). The root cause of much addiction is unmet social needs. 
Since social issues vary region by region, community members will know best how to address 
the common social ails in their community. Correspondingly, SAMHSA recommends that 
policymakers seek to empower communities to address the social determinants of behavioral 
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health. Public education constitutes one key tool for community empowerment. NIDA argues a 
second way to prevent SUDs is to identify at risk children and provide rapid intervention at the 
first signs of drug use. The corresponding policy is to bring mental health care into schools. The 
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids advocates for a third method to decrease the incidence of 
SUDs: restrict access to addictive drugs. 
 
Texas nonprofits, police departments, school districts, city councils, and other organizations 
continue to push on all three fronts. In the coming months, Central Health will enter the ongoing 
fight to get addictive substances out of the reach of children. Central Health is Travis County’s 
hospital district, but it runs no hospitals. The voters of Travis County created the organization in 
2004 to eliminate the County’s health disparities, thereby achieving “health equity.”  
Toward this end, Central Health administers two publicly subsidized insurance plans, one of 
which is for the county’s indigent population (Central Health). The organization also provides 
oversight of and some funding for CommUnityCare, a private, non-profit primary care health 
Goal Policy Framework Example Policies 
Address social ails Community empowerment Representation in local 
government; public education 
on SUDs 
Early diagnosis and rapid 
intervention 
Mental health in schools Fund school counselors; train 
teachers to identify SUDs 
Restrict access to addictive 
drugs  
Drug-control laws and 
enforcement 
Restrict the age of sale of 
tobacco; restrict prescription 
authority for opioids 
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system for underserved populations (CommUnityCare). Additionally, Central Health brings 
together local community and public health professionals for networking events and its Equity 
Policy Council bi-annual meetings. Around 50 community members, including employees of 
Austin Public Health, the University of Texas at Austin, State Senator Kirk Watson’s office, 
Integral Care (the Local Mental Health Authority), and Travis County Health and Human 
Services, attended the July 2019 Policy Council meeting. A local judge and representatives of 
Austin’s numerous nonprofits also attended.  
At this meeting, the opioid crisis came up, and a polite but heated debate broke out. One council 
member attacked the group’s focus on opioids, a drug associated with white men, while the 
drugs that have been plaguing the black community continue to be ignored.  
“This is the equity policy council, after all.”  
A public health researcher who devoted the past five years of her life to the study of opioid use 
shot back that, despite the association of the drug, it is also a women’s issue, and it is predicted 
to be an issue for every community in the future. Ultimately, the Equity Policy Council will 
decide Central Health’s policy priorities by vote. Before then, the Policy Council’s research 
committee will decide on which items the council will vote. The research committee sets the 
agenda. 
The Central Health Equity Policy Council research committee is a group of volunteers. Its 
monthly attendees include a county health official, an Austin Public Health employee, an 
American Heart Association government relations specialist, myself, researchers, a consultant 
hired by Central Health, and Central Health’s full-time policy and advocacy director. Those of us 
who are not paid to be there attend because we enjoy learning from one other. 
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In late July of 2019, eight of us began discussing flavored nicotine products. We agreed that 
flavored products target children, often causing nicotine addiction. The US Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention reported that in 2018 more than one in four high school students used a 
tobacco product; “This increase—driven by a surge in e-cigarette use—erased past progress in 
reducing youth tobacco product use.” Past progress is the result of a 60-plus-year political and 
legal war against big tobacco that climaxed in $264 billion dollar settlement around the turn of 
the century (“Tobacco Master Settlement” 2019). We all agreed we ought to do something about 
youth e-cigarette use, and two solutions were put forward: ban flavored tobacco products or 
restrict them to 21-and-up stores. We quickly decided that banning tobacco flavoring would be 
too steep an uphill battle. “Austin isn’t San Francisco.”  
So, we focused on the more feasible option.  
“If this restriction were to pass city council, would the tobacco companies sue Austin Public 
Health?”3  
“Well, didn’t Bloomberg agree to pay for the legal defense of any tobacco-control ordinance?” 
People nodded. 
“So are we all okay with moving forward with this policy? We should keep in mind Juul is 
moving into Austin.” 
 
3 Tobacco companies have a history of suing local governments to increase the financial burden 
of passing a tobacco-control ordinance. In this way, the industry has sought to deter other cities 
from passing similar ordinances (Nixon, Mahmoud, and Glantz 2004).  
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“They’ve been pretty egregious in their marketing. I’ve seen posters that advertises Juul as a way 
to quit smoking, which sends the message that it’s not addictive.” 
“It’s also been proven an ineffective method for quitting.” 
The research council navigated the world of big tobacco and billionaires. In a few months, the 
policy will likely go before the full Policy Council. If selected, Central Health will find 
champions for the policy and support them as they talk to Austin’s City Council. The political 
process will take months to years. Some members of the research committee will likely move to 
a new city or otherwise stop being able to attend. Central Health’s paid policy team, however, 
will continue advocating for the chosen policy position.  
When bringing ideas to the attention of policymakers, persistence is key. If the ordinance 
passes, the State Legislature may try to overturn it in the following session and Austin Public 
Health may face a lawsuit. The timescale for setting public policy is at best years and at worst 
decades. Publicly financing a policy coordinator, as does Central Health, ensures that important 
issues do not get dropped. The other genius in Central Health’s strategy is that it brings together 
members of health organizations across Travis County. By networking and distributing 
information to these individuals, Central Health facilitates the decentralized, institution-by-
institution evolution of policy. In summary, Central Health pursues positive change through 
every avenue.  
Further Reading 
Macy, Beth. Dopesick: Dealers, Doctors, and the Drug Company that Addicted America. New  
York: Little, Brown, and Company. 2018. 
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Beth Macy makes use of her unique connections as an ex-local reporter in Virginia to trace the 
opioid epidemic from its beginnings in Appalachia to its spread across the nation. This well-
researched page turner provides a comprehensive look not just at the extent of the crisis, but 
also the responses. She describes some responses that are effective and some ineffective, 
including measures taken at the family, school, state, and federal levels.  
Case, Anne and Angus Deaton. Deaths of Despair: And the Future of Capitalism. Princeton:  
Princeton University. 2020. 
Two leading economists (one a Nobel-winner) take an analytic look at the factors driving income 
inequality, suicidality, drug overdoses, and chemical dependence in the United States. Case and 
Deaton provide an academic, birds’ eye view of the opioid crisis that complements Macy’s local 
perspective. While the whole book is worth reading, I recommend chapters eight and nine, in 
particular, because they describe how a burgeoning meritocracy and national shakedown are 
exacting a steep toll on the mental wellbeing of the American working class.  
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Chapter 7: Tobacco 21 & the Influence of National Politics 
Tobacco’s addictive component is the chemical nicotine. Nicotine is likely less addictive than 
concentrated opioids, similarly addictive to benzodiazepines and alcohol, and more addictive 
than sugar, videogames, and exercise (Nutt, et al.). The regulation of nicotine products is 
contentious. Public health experts recognize the damage caused by use of nicotine to personal 
finances, mental health, and physical health. They also recognize that the complete removal of 
nicotine from the market would be disastrous for those already dependent on it. Their goal, 
therefore, is to prevent the substance from finding new users. “Tobacco 21 bills” are one tool to 
do so. They raise the minimum legal age of sale for nicotine-containing products to 21. These 
bills saw a lot of action in the 2019 US and Texas legislative sessions. 
In May of 2019, the Texas Tribune reported: “Texas' moves on the tobacco age are in line with a 
national trend. Last month, representatives in both the US House and Senate introduced 
legislation to raise the national purchase age for tobacco from 18 to 21. Senate Majority Leader 
This chapter assesses why the national political scene has shifted strongly in favor of 
restricting the age of sale for tobacco products. The chapter begins by discussing the 
tobacco industry’s surprising response to the epidemic of youth e-cigarette use. It then 
addresses how worried Republican leaders partnered with the tobacco industry to woo 
suburban women back to the GOP. Last, the chapter examines how these national 
politics have influenced efforts in the Texas Legislature to restrict tobacco’s age of sale. 
This chapter argues ultimately that a savvy advocate can take advantage of the larger 
political moment. 
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Mitch McConnell and the tobacco industry have also expressed support for such legislation, 
though Politico reported last month that anti-tobacco advocates fear the efforts are a ‘Trojan 
horse’ to block other, more proven measures to reduce youth smoking such as flavor bans and 
higher taxes on tobacco products” (Byrne). 
The fact that Juul and other tobacco industry members support raising the legal age of sale marks 
a sharp change in strategy from previous years. Philip Morris, Inc. was one of the four tobacco 
companies forced to settle in the landmark 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement 
(“Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement”). Part of the settlement prohibited Philip Morris from 
continuing to market tobacco to children. The company was found violating this provision, 
among other laws, in a 2006 racketeering case (“United States v. Philip Morris”). Philip Morris, 
Inc. changed its name to Altria in 2003, a public relations strategy to distance the company from 
its criminal wrongdoing. Altria now owns a controlling share of Juul, the most popular e-
cigarette maker (“Juul”). On April 24, 2018, the federal Food and Drug Administration 
announced it “has been conducting a large-scale, undercover nationwide blitz to crack down on 
the sale of e-cigarettes – specifically JUUL products – to minors … The blitz … has already 
revealed numerous violations of the law.” The FDA is also investigating Juul for marketing 
nicotine-containing products to children (USFDA). 
Sharon Eubanks led the Justice Department’s racketeering case against Philip Morris, Inc. She 
described tobacco industry support for tobacco 21 legislation as “a Jedi mind trick,” meant to 
obscure industry’s contribution to the youth vaping epidemic (Dreisbach). Whatever the motives 
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of its proponents, in early 2019, McConnell and Kaine’s bill stalled in the US Senate.1 Texas, 
meanwhile, passed its tobacco 21 legislation. 
State Sen. Joan Huffman, a Republican from Houston, led the effort to pass Senate Bill 21. The 
bill had fifteen other authors and coauthors in the Senate, and twenty-one sponsors and co-
sponsors in the House in addition to the clear support of the Lieutenant Governor. Andrew 
Hendrickson, the experienced staffer in State Sen. Zaffirini’s office who worked on SB 21, did 
not feel there was “any reason to think” that the tobacco industry brought the bill to Sen. 
Huffman. Huffman filed a similar bill during the previous legislative session. “Morever, most of 
the experts [Hendrickson consulted] agreed the bill is good policy.” While it may have taken the 
steam out of other efforts to reduce youth e-cigarette use, SB 21 “has positive impacts that 
shouldn’t be ignored.” 
Tobacco control advocates worry that tobacco 21 legislation may contain pre-emption clauses or 
inadequate enforcement (Myers); however, neither of these concerns appear to apply in Texas’ 
case. SB 21 has a pre-emption clause, but it is narrow. The bill prevents local governments from 
raising the legal age of sale above 21. Additional methods of tobacco-control, such as those 
discussed by the Central Health Policy Council, are generally permissible. SB 21 leaves 




1 A bipartisan coalition of senators ultimately succeeded in raising the national age of sale by 
attaching the policy to a defense budget bill (Howard). 
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So, did this bill pass because it was a good idea? In 2017, the policy had the official support of 
no Republican senators besides Huffman. The 2017 bill did not receive a committee hearing 
(TLO, “SB 910”). In 2019, the Lieutenant Governor put his full weight behind the policy, 
assigning the bill, poetically, the number 21. The bill overcame challenges in both chambers of 
the Legislature. Ultimately it passed in the House, with 110 votes in favor, 36 against, and 2 
abstaining, and in the Senate with 27 yeas and 4 nays (TLO, “SB 21”).  
So why did the Lieutenant Governor decide to support tobacco 21 legislation the second time 
around? We have to consider that the Lieutenant Governor’s job is not to move good policy. It is 
to maintain party strength. That goal means keeping the Democrats in check and the Republicans 
voting as a unit. In the current political moment, his job also entails defending Republicans in 
general elections. 
In 2014, Sen. Huffman won re-election by 52,900 votes. In 2018, against the same opponent, 
Sen. Huffman won re-election by just 14,300 votes. Huffman’s district includes a large swathe of 
Houston suburbs, a politically moderate population moving notably further away from the 
Republican party in the wake of President Trump (Mason 2019). The region selected a pro-
choice Republican, Rep. Sarah Davis, to represent them in the Texas House of Representatives, a 
sign of suburban women’s voting power and moderate political orientation (Houston Chronicle 
Editorial Board). Senate Bill 21 is a progressive piece of legislation. Patrick may have boosted 
the bill to give Huffman a win in her district. If he did, it would be consistent with the way many 
staffers in the Legislature believe he operates. 
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Assuming my assessment is correct, public attitudes, namely suburban women’s concern for 
school-age children, drove SB 21’s passage. Naturally then, effective advocacy can target public 
opinion in swing districts as a means to effect policy change. We can also see room to make use 
of this causal relationship in direct advocacy. If behavioral health advocates understand the 
political moment, they can frame their initiatives as responding to current crises and delivering a 
political win for key constituencies and therefore party leaders. In this way, advocates can more 
effectively sell policies to policymakers. So long as politicians continue to fight for the 
allegiance of suburban women, behavioral health advocates should align their proposals with the 
priorities of this constituency. 
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Mason, Melanie. “In suburban Texas, ‘it feels like there’s no place for lifelong Republicans like  
me.’” LATimes.com. Aug. 13, 2019. Retrieved from  
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-13/texas-congress-suburban-women- 
republicans. 
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Pulling from the content of the past seven chapters, the conclusion analyzes the three strands of 
effective advocacy first presented in the introduction. Afterwards, it assesses the generalizability 
of these theories. The penultimate section comment on behavioral health policy options that may 
soon be politically feasible to implement. The final paragraphs identify a few remaining 
questions worth answering in behavioral health policy. 
Effective advocacy influences public attitudes. 
In the introduction, I discussed how public opinion can tie lawmakers’ hands. The public’s fear 
of individuals experiencing homeless, for example, pushed the Austin City Council to partially 
reverse its camping decriminalization policy (CBS Austin). Undoubtably, public attitudes can 
also force action. The Santa Fe shooting prompted state investment in mental health in schools. 
Furthermore, moderate suburban women’s alienation from the national Republican Party may 
have fueled passage of tobacco 21 legislation. 
These are high profile battles. They deal with the life and death of Austinites, children, and the 
Republican Party respectively. So, what happens with all the issues dealt with by the Texas 
Legislature that do not catch the public’s attention? The Early Childhood Intervention program’s 
funding crisis is a good example. Action may have been forced if the issue had more press, but 
more press may also have prevented prominent Republicans from entertaining a new insurance 
coverage mandate. Advocates should realize the political rules are different when the spotlight is 
pointed somewhere else. 
Last, to influence public attitudes, you do not need a major media campaign. The job can be 
simple, like providing educational materials that empower consumers to fight back when an 
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insurance provider violates mental health parity law. The job can also include building trust 
between communities; for example, between adolescent behavioral health experts and parents or 
between individuals experiencing homelessness and the public. 
Effective advocacy changes who holds office. 
I began this thesis by discussing the singular power of the lieutenant governor. This directly 
elected official has much greater influence over legislation that any individual representative. 
Generally, the lieutenant governor passes what policies he wants and blocks all that he does not. 
The holder of this office matters a lot when it comes to state appropriations. Other key officials, 
like gubernatorial appointees to state agencies and the directly elected Attorney General, have 
profound power and discretion over insurance policy. If you have made an enemy of one of these 
individuals, or they oppose your favored policy, you may have no hope but to try and change 
who holds office. Barring these scenarios, however, there is value in bringing your thoughts to 
legislators if you are smart about how you do it. 
Effective advocacy brings new ideas to the attention of policymakers. 
I made the claim in the introduction that direct advocacy can effect change if the advocate is 
well-informed in policy and politics. The last seven chapters described how advocates apply 
these two types of knowledge to influence those in positions of power. Alissa Suhgrue knew the 
issues important to NAMI inside and out. She was available to talk to staffers, and she was ready 
to testify anytime during Session. From Alissa’s story, I hope potential advocates learn that there 
are a number of people not just interesting in helping you push innovation in behavioral health 
policy, but paid to do it. 
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Faced with a funding crisis, Early Childhood Intervention program managers and care providers 
used the same strategies as Alissa, although they did it in their spare time. Effective advocacy in 
this context involved assisting legislative staffers by providing evidence-based and thoughtful 
feedback promptly when asked for it. If you are trustworthy, you will build trust. Trust will 
encourage staffers to fight for your bill. The stories of disability advocate Lauren Rangel’s work 
on Early Childhood Intervention enrollment and Central Health ‘s work on youth vaping 
illustrate two additional points: Effective advocates are in it for the long hall, and there are many 
ways to address a particular issue. Advocates should not get hung up on one policy solution, but 
rather take every path to address a problem. 
The chapter on mental health parity implementation highlights how advocates can leverage 
expertise and lived experience in the processes of ironing out policy specifics. Stakeholders who 
do not have the patience for this admittedly long and dry process might find legislative advocacy 
more their speed. As we saw with the mental health in schools movement, there are strategies to 
boost your odds of passing a bill. You should try to make the bill revenue neutral and frame it as 
a response to a current crisis. Furthermore, Texas’ tobacco 21 legislation taught us that a savvy 
advocate can design a bill to deliver party leaders a political victory, while also addressing a 
particular issue. 
Generalizability 
I made arguments for three theories of effective advocacy based on historical evidence. A lot of 
this evidence is anecdotal or gathered from just one legislative session. Naturally, this fact draws 
into question the applicability of the theories outside of Texas’ 86th Legislature and, more 
generally, 2019. Moreover, policy and politics change constantly. The “political moment” has 
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shifted dramatically over just the last three months due the Covid-19 pandemic. The continued 
relevance of my theories depends on two relative certainties and two key uncertainties.  
First, Texas will remain a conservative state. Elected officials will continue to respect their 
constituents’ preferences. Despite the strong performance of Democrats in the 2018 election, 
Texans are not going to abandon their suspicion of government and ideologic resistance to 
welfare and regulatory expansion (Yglesias). Second, many key players will not change. While 
true that Texas’ demographic trends are making many general elections more competitive, 
statewide elections are not likely to be competitive for some time (Yglesias). Even during the 
2018 “blue wave” that swept many Democrats into local offices, Governor Abbott still won by a 
margin of 13 points, and the Lieutenant Governor won by 5. The Republican candidates for 
Comptroller, Commissioner of the General Land Office, and Railroad Commissioner all won by 
10 points. The controversial Sid Miller won Commissioner of Agriculture by 5 points. Even the 
incumbent Attorney General, Ken Paxton, who was indicted on felony securities fraud and 
awaiting trial, won re-election by three and a half points (OSOS). We can expect many of the 
institutional and political determinants of a bill’s fate to remain constant.  
While few of the directly elected top positions are likely to change hands, the Speaker of the 
House will change by 2021 (Pollock). The most recent speaker, Dennis Bonnen, chose to be a 
unifying figure in the House, notably appointing Democrats and moderate Republicans to be 
committee chairs (Pollock, Samuels, and Platoff). Since Bonnen has announced his retirement, 
the House must pick a new Speaker in the coming months. Who they will elect is a key 
uncertainty. House members could select someone further to the right than Bonnen, or they could 
pick again a leader who honors Joe Straus’ legacy of bipartisanship. There is also a potential for 
Democrats to gain control of the Texas House in the 2020 election, securing them a Democratic 
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Speaker (Pollock and Svitek). If that occurs, the political dynamics of the Texas Legislature will 
change significantly, and additional advocacy strategies may become relevant.  
The second key uncertainty is the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on Texas politics. The 
pandemic has already decimated the budgets of local and state governments across the nation. 
Texas will be especially hard hit due to the collapse of oil prices (Garnham). Houston Mayor 
Sylvester Turner gave a glum forecast: “We work on the budget year-round, and we anticipate 
even the worst scenarios. This one is even worse than anyone had imagined” (As cited by 
Garnham). No one knows what the full toll of the pandemic will be, whether Congress will bail 
out state and local governments, or how the pandemic will change Texas politics. History argues 
that times of crisis often lead to precedent-setting expansions of the federal government. While 
the pandemic might unleash a new era in federal spending, Texas is unlikely to follow suit 
because of its constitutional balanced-budget requirement and, of course, its inability to print 
money. As far as behavioral health policy is concerned, I expect Texas’ state and local 
governments will cut back on physical and mental health services to address budget shortfalls.  
Some of the knowledge needed to be an effective advocate will change. Undoubtably, this thesis 
focuses on the facts that were important during the 86th Legislative Session. This work will 
remain relevant, however, because it introduces readers to the larger factors that influence 
behavioral health politics in Texas, including institutional structures, the political moment, and 
the limited influence of constituent preferences. When behavioral health stakeholders look to 
influence policy in the future, I hope my thesis will have clarified both the importance of these 




Issue Areas Ripe for Change 
I have outlined many obstacles to changing Texas’ behavioral health status quo. Assuming a 
quick recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, I have a hunch the timing may soon be right to 
address a couple longstanding grievances with our system. First, we could complete the 
development of Texas’ psychiatric workforce. Other states have done it (HRSA); Texas can too. 
Texas politicians recognize that our health care market is not healthy (Texas Legislature). When 
it comes to behavioral health care, high demand and low supply clearly contributes to the 
market’s failure to serve the population. We can increase supply not just by expanding training 
programs for psychiatrists, psychiatric nurse practitioners, and clinical psychologists, but also by 
requiring insurance plans to reimburse the work of peer counselors, community health workers, 
and case managers. These proposals are not new, but at last individuals on both sides of the aisle 
can agree on the problem.  
In addition to market reform, policymakers have a new appetite for mental illness prevention. 
“Mental hygiene” is also not a new concept, but political leaders, moved by mass shootings and 
afraid of voters in suburban Texas, have at last been willing to take up the cause. Credit for this 
change should also go to lawmakers, like State Representative Garnet Coleman, who have spent 
decades destigmatizing mental illness.1 Promising prevention policies include expanding school-
based counseling services, creating behavioral health education programs for parents, and laying 
high-speed internet cables that would enable tele-health in rural areas. While these proposals 
 
1 In 2003, Rep. Coleman publicly acknowledged he had bipolar disorder. The 86th Legislative 
Session marked Coleman’s 28th year in office, and as Chair of the House County Affairs 
Committee, he continued to show other lawmakers that individuals with chronic mental illness 




carry significant price tags, they could provide cost savings to the state several years after 
implementation. Unfortunately, net savings is not a given, and the hypothetical impacts of the 
policies are not easy to study. 
Future Studies 
This thesis examines strategies to improve behavioral health policy as a private advocate. A 
future study should assess strategies to promote public mental health from the perspective of the 
public sector. In other words, if the State decides it has money to put towards public mental 
health, how should it spend it? Two questions follow: Which behavioral health policy 
interventions are the most cost effective? And, which are sustainable? 
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Appendix A: Texas Legislative Advocacy Timeline 
The Texas Legislature convenes for 140 days at the start of every odd numbered year. Advocates 
need to plan when to communicate their ideas to legislators. Even though legislating is a part-
time job in Texas, policy development goes year-round. The following guide provides a timeline 
for legislative advocacy in accordance with the Texas Legislature’s unique biannual calendar. In 
addition to pairing step-by-step recommendations with this calendar, I offer a few suggestions to 
improves chances of bill passage during each phase. This guide is meant for policy proposals that 
are inexpensive. For proposals with a price tag, you should move the steps listed in the timeline 
up by a few months and engage members of the House Appropriations or Senate Finance 
committees from an early point. 
 
No later than January through July of an even numbered year: 
1. Prepare your policy proposal. 
A. Recommendations: Establish why the bill is necessary. 
B. Make the policy change revenue neutral. 
C. Include a way to measure and evaluate the policy’s impact, if it were to become 
law. 
2. Start coalition building. 
 
During August through November of an even numbered year: 
1. Bring your proposal to at least one legislator in the House and Senate. 
A. Pick the legislator whose district is most impacted by the issue. 
B. If there is not a district most impacted, pick the relevant committee chairs. 
C. If the committee chairs are not interested in authoring the bill, pick a legislator 
with a history of working on similar issues.  
a. Keep in mind, you can ask multiple legislators in each chamber to author 
or sponsor the bill.  
b. Note that if you file identical bills in each chamber at the start of session, 
the bills are technically separate pieces of legislation. One will need to 
move through both chambers for the policy to become law. The state 
budget is the only bill that can be processed in both chambers 
simultaneously. 
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2. Work with capitol staffers and attorneys to draft bill language. 
3. Reach out to any likely opponents of your bill. Explain your position and ask for 
feedback. 
4. Be prepared to assist capitol staffers as they vet your bill with the relevant stakeholders. 
5. Try to accommodate any concerns about the bill and work with legislative staff to edit 
bill language accordingly. 
6. Bills can be pre-filed in early November. Encourage legislators to file once the bill 
language is finalized. 
 
During December through January: 
1. Help capitol staff develop a one-page brief on your bill. 
A. The “one-pager” should outline why the bill is necessary, what it costs, who 
supports it, and who opposes it. 
B. Assume your audience is unfamiliar with behavioral health and even less familiar 
with behavioral health policy. 
2. Talk with the relevant committee chair offices in the House and Senate; advocate for your 
bill to get a hearing. 
3. While the legislative session begins in early January, the state budget is typically the only 
item considered during this month. 
4. Pester your chosen legislator’s staff to file your bill no later than the end of January, even 
though the official deadline is not until March. 
 
During February through the first week of May (of an odd numbered year): 
1. Your bill will be referred to a committee. Lobby the appropriate committee chair for a 
hearing, if you have not done so already. 
2. Try to be available to testify from roughly the second week of February through the first 





3. If a committee chair schedules your bill for a hearing, you or your partner legislative 
office should distribute the one pager to every member of the committee. Ideally, you 
would meet with staff in each office as well.  
A. Remember your bill is never safe from opposition.  
B. Do not expect opposition to announce themselves to you.  
C. Check in frequently with legislative staffers working on your bill to make sure 
they are doing their part. 
4. If your bill is voted out of committee, distribute your one pager to all members of the 
appropriate chamber of the Legislature. 
5. If your bill passes in one chamber, repeat steps one through four once it has been sent to 
the other chamber.  
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Appendix B: Summary of 86th Legislature Statistics 
Sample size 
Legislators: 181 
• Representatives: 147 
o Democrats: 64 
o Republicans: 83 
• Senators: 31 
o Democrats: 12 
o Republicans: 19 
Bill count: 10878 
• Bills-that-became-law count: 4484 
Methods 
I downloaded three LegiScan.com datasets with information about Texas’ 86th Legislature. I 
merged all three to create one dataset that tied each bill to its primary author, the author’s 
political party, and the bill’s “final status,” including information on whether or not it became 
law. I added a column coding how many chairships each legislator held and merged that data 
with the composite set. I used Pearson’s Chi-Squared test to compare groups of legislators’ 
success rates (bills that became law divided by bills filed). I used a p-value cut-off of 0.05 to 
conclude whether two groups of lawmakers had significantly different success rates. 
Key Findings 
Committee chairs’ bills became law at a significantly higher rate than those of non-chairs. This 
finding was consistent when looking just at legislators from one political party. 
Table 1: Chairs and Non-chairs 
 Chairs Non-chairs P-Value 
Success Rate 0.46 0.38 2.2e-16 
 
Table 2: Democrat Chairs and Non-chairs 
 D Chairs D Non-chairs P-Value 






Table 3: Republican Chairs and Non-chairs 
 R Chairs R Non-chairs P-Value 
Success Rate 0.49 0.44 0.00026 
 
Other Findings 
Republicans’ bills became law at a significantly higher rate than Democrats’ bills. This finding 
was consistent when looking just at bills with the same chamber of origin. 
Table 4: Democrats and Republicans 
 Democrats Republicans P-Value 
Success Rate 0.35 0.46 2.2e-16 
 
Table 5: House of Representatives Democrats and Republicans 
 D Representatives R Representatives P-Value 
Success Rate 0.36 0.49 2.2e-16 
 
Table 6: Senate Democrats and Republicans 
 D Senators R Senators P-Value 




Bills that became law because they were amended onto a separate bill could not be distinguished 
in the data and therefore were not counted as a successful bill.  
Bill passage rates correlate with the political party and status as a chair or non-chair. This 
correlation could easily be caused by a confounding variable, namely bill content. This analysis 
is therefore of very limited applicability for advocates wondering if they should pick a 
republican, democrat, or committee chair to file their bill. Moreover, the 87th Legislature will 
have a new Speaker of the House and may see a different party in control the House. What 
makes a bill likely to succeed may be very different in the next legislative session. 
